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I. INTRODUCTION

The use of psychotropic drugs by mental institutions across the
United States to medicate mental patients is a widespread phenomenon
that is relatively unknown by the American public.' These drugs,
which include Thorazine, Prolixin, Haldol, and Lithium, are effective
in altering mental patients' moods, behavior, and thought processes, 2
and, therefore, are used by psychiatrists and hospital staff to control
mental patients who suffer from various psychoses.8 The primary
motivations of the medical profession in the application of psychotropic
4
drugs to mental patients has shifted from concern to convenience.
1. See notes 6 &24 and accompanying text infra.
2. For a detailed discussion of psychotropic drugs, see notes 24-61 and
accompanying text infra. Various United States district courts have noted that
psychotropic drugs are effective in reducing thought disorder in a majority of
schizophrenics; a success unequalled by any other treatment modality. See
Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 927 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rennie v. Klein,
462 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (D.N.J. 1978), modified, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J.
1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3059 (1981), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d
836 (3d Cir. 1981). However, many doctors, including Loren R. Mosher, Chief
of the Center for Studies of Schizophrenia at the National Institute of Mental
Health, remain strictly opposed to treating schizophrenics with drugs. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 1979, at C2, col. 2.
3. See note 24 and accompanying text infra.
4. See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (D.N.J. 1979), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 3059 (1981), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
The district court in Rennie v. Klein cited a study by Dr. George Crane, a
psychiatrist, which concluded that psychotropic drugs are prescribed by hospital
staff doctors to solve all types of management problems in addition to medical
problems. Id. at 1299 (quoting G. Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology in Its
20th Year, 181 SCIENCE 124 (1973)). The study concluded that "[m]any physicians, nurses, guardians and family members who resent the patient's behavior
and are threatened by potential acts of violence fail to distinguish between
manifestations of illness and reactions to frustrations" in their application of
the drugs. Id. The medical staff at the institution gains a feeling of accomplishment from the patient's adherence to a regimented treatment program,
while the nursing personnel and relatives, who are in more direct contact with
the patient, derive a spurious feeling of security when the doctor's orders are
implemented. Id. These practices by hospital staff members must be viewed
with respect to the hospital conditions in which they occur. As one commentator notes, "the evidence is legion that . . . mental hospitals are overcrowded, understaffed and underfinanced. There is such a shortage of physicians [that many of the doctors] are not fully licensed to practice in the state
in which they are working." Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461, 463-64 (1978)
(footnotes omitted). See M. A. PIEZKE, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT FOR THE
MENTALLY ILL: THE PROBLEM OF AUTONOMY 66-68, 74 (1975); Rennie v. Klein,
476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (D.N.J. 1979) (mental hospitals in issue are understaffed and patients have trouble seeing a psychiatrist); Rennie v. Klein, 462
F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (D.N.J. 1978) (doctors at mental hospital do not have
sufficient time for each patient). As a consequence of the deficiencies of the
mental hospitals and their staffs, rather than the severity of the patient's behavior or disorder, resort to psychotropic drugs for treatment follows. Plotkin
& Gill, Invisible Manacles: Drugging Mentally Retarded People, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 637, 650 (1979); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
: Hosp., 446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1303, 1307-08 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979)
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Studies show that psychotropic drugs are overused by mental institutions in the name of orderly hospital administration rather than patient rehabilitation, and that this overuse results in patients' dependence
on such drugs. 5 This extensive use of the psychotropic drugs by mental
patients causes them to experience transient and permanent physical
and mental side effects, including tardive dyskinesia (characterized' by
involuntary muscle movements) and drug-induced parkinsonism6
These side effects have caused involuntarily committed mental
patients to refuse treatment with psychotropic drugs and to seek to
establish their rights to refuse treatment in the courts. Recently, two
federal appellate courts have recognized qualified constitutional rights
7
to refuse psychotropic drugs.
In Rennie v. Klein,8 the Third Circuit held that mental patients
have a qualified constitutional right to refuse drugs.9 In so holding,
the Third Circuit concluded that medication with antipsychotic drugs
(en banc), rev'd and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981); Welsh v. Likens, 373
F. Supp. 487, 503 (D. Minn. 1974), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 550 F.2d 1122
(8th Cir. 1977). The drugs are often actually administered by untrained staff
in high dosages for extended periods and are used in combination with other
drugs. Further, the patients' progress is often not adequately monitored. See
Plotkin 8c Gill, supra, at 650-51. See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. at 1300-03
(inadequate diagnosis, administration, and monitoring of drug treatment exists).
See also In re Guardianship of Roe, - Mass. -, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). In Roe,
the court noted that other commentators and courts "have identified abuses
of antipsychotic medication by those claiming to act in an incompetent's best
interests." Id. at 53 n.1l (citing Plotkin, supra; Baldessarini &cLipinski, Risks
v. Benefits of Antipsychotic Drugs, 289 Naw ENG. 1. MED. 427 (1973); Comment,
Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48
TEMPLE L.Q. 354, 364 (1975); Mackay v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.
1973); Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979); Nelson v. Heyne,
355 F. Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Ind. 1972), afl'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974)).
5. See note 4 supra.
6. See notes 27, 28, 44-56 & 268-72 and accompanying text infra. The
district courts that have discussed the nature of psychotropic drugs have been
unanimous in highlighting these side effects. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.
Supp. 915, 927-29 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1359-60
(D. Mass. 1979), modified, vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982); Rennie
v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299-1300 (D.N.J. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
3059 (1981), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
7. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Okin,
634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers,
102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
8. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). For a discussion of Rennie, see notes
63-132 and accompanying text infra.
9. 653 F.2d at 838. Rennie was decided in the context of one type of
psychotropic drug, the antipsychotics. Id. For a discussion of the antipsychotics, see notes 21-56 and accompanying text infra. The Rennie court
applied its constitutional analysis to only involuntarily committed mental patients because a New Jersey statute afforded voluntarily committed mental
patients the right to refuse treatment. 653 F.2d at 848 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-24.2(d)(1) (West. 1981)).
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cannot be given, even where sedation of the patient is justified, until
the hospital medical staff determines that there exists no less restrictive
alternative treatment. 10 The medical staff is required to explore the
various means available to control the patients, and to select the treatment which restricts the patient's liberty in the least degree possible."
The Rennie court also highlighted other issues implicated by the
recognition of the right to refuse drugs, including the procedures that
due process requires for implementation and protection of this right,'2
and what circumstances constitute an "emergency situation" which relieves the hospital medical staff from affording mental patients these
procedural due process protections."
In Rogers v. Okin, 4 the First Circuit also recognized a constitutional right to refuse drugs and similarly adopted the "least restrictive
alternative" as a factor in defining the scope of that right.' 5 The
Supreme Court in Mills v. Rogers 16 vacated the First Circuit's decision;
17
however, it did not reach the constitutional issues.
This comment will focus on the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine adopted by these two federal appellate courts in the
context of the mental patient's right to refuse drugs. A critical issue
in defining the scope of the right to refuse treatment is whether the
presence of a less restrictive alternative means of treatment should be
a constitutional factor. Proponents of the application of the doctrine
in this context argue that it is both an appropriate and necessary factor
in the balancing of the interests of the state and the patient."8 Critics
of the doctrine argue that its application brings the judiciary into conflict with medical professionals and places the judge in a position of
reviewing and second-guessing medical decisions.19 The purpose of
this comment is to present a proposed resolution of this conflict.
This comment will first discuss the psychotropic drugs, specifically
the antipsychotics, and their effects on the individual. 20 Next, it will
examine the decisions in Rennie v. Klein and Rogers v. Okin, outlining their respective analyses of the right to refuse and the least re10. 653 F.2d at 845.
1l. Id.
12. See 653 F.2d at 848-51. For a discussion of the relevant due process
issues, see notes 101-12 and accompanying text infra.
13. See 653 F.2d at 847. See also notes 95-98 infra.
14. 634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nora. Mills v.
Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). For a discussion of Rogers, see notes 132-69

and accompanying text infra.
15. See 634 F.2d at 656; notes 142-55 and accompanying text infra.
16. 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
17. See 102 S. Ct. at 2442; notes 156-69 and accompanying text infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 92-99 & 146-49 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 111-31 infra.
20. See notes 24-61 and accompanying text infra.
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strictive alternative treatment doctrine.2 ' It will also present the arguments against the application of the doctrine as expressed by the
concurring opinions in Rennie.22 Finally, this comment will analyze
whether the least restrictive alternative doctrine should be recognized
as a constitutional factor in cases involving the rights of involuntarily
committed mental patients. It ultimately concludes that, in light of its
application by the federal courts in other contexts and in light of a
review of the benefits and detriments to those affected by its application, including the patient, psychiatrist, judiciary, and state, the doctrine should be a required factor in defining the scope of the right to
refuse treatment.2
II. THE PROBLEM:
THE USE OF PSYcHOTROPIc DRUGS

Psychotropic drugs are commonly used in mental hospitals for the
treatment of committed patients24 afflicted with any of the various
psychoses such as the schizophrenic disorders25 or any of the major
affective disorders. 2
The psychotropics' main utility lies in their
ability to alter the moods, behavior, and thought processes of the pa21. For a discussion of Rennie v. Klein, see notes 62-131 and accompanying
text infra. For a discussion of Rogers v. Okin, see notes 132-69 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 110-31 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 170-284 and accompanying text infra.
24. Crane, supra note 5, at 124. These drugs have been used for the
treatment of psychiatric disorders since the early fifties. See Plotkin, supra
note 5, at 474. In the last 20 years, psychotropic drugs have been regularly
used to treat the most serious forms of mental illness. Crane, supra note 5,
at 124. One study of drug therapy has revealed that in four state hospitals,
slightly over 93% of the patients were receiving psychotropic drugs. Mason.
Newiano & De Burger, Patterns of Antipsychotic Drug Use in Four Southeastern
State Hospitals, 38 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 541 (1977). Another
study of long-term patients at a state hospital indicated that 85% of such
patients were taking psychotropic drugs. Crane, supra note 5, at 128 n.13.

For an excellent discussion of psychotropic drugs in general, see Plotkin, supra

note 5, at 474-79.
25. The symptoms associated with schizophrenia include disordered thought
patterns, inappropriate affect (either the absence of emotional display or
heightened emotional reactions), ambivalence and autism (withdrawal into a
fantasy life). See CANCIO, SCHIZOPHRENIA: CLINICAL ASPECTS, BIOLOGICAL BASES
OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 181 (1977).
Hallucinations, typically in the form of
hearing voices that do not exist, and delusions-fixed, false beliefs-may also be
present. Id. at 183-84. Schizophrenia may be acute, with a relatively rapid
onset, or chronic, with a slow, insidious development. Id. at 185.
26. Among the major affective disorders are depression, characterized by
extreme feelings of sadness, hopelessness and guilt, and by slowing of the
thought processes and speech, and manic-depressive illness, in which periods
of depression alternate with periods of mania, with the patient exhibiting
elation, excitement, grandiosity and rapid flight of ideas. BECK & GREENBURG,
DEPRESSION:

CLINICAL ASPECTS,

201 (1977); A.

BIOLOGICAL BASES OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
CHAPMAN, TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (2d ed. 1976).
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tient. 27 Up to the present time the controversy in the right to refuse
treatment cases has focused primarily, although not exclusively, on the
common and forcible use of one class of psychotropic drug,-the anti28
psychotics.
The antipsychotics, 29 also referred to as neuroleptics, are commonly used in treating patients with diagnoses of schizophrenia,O or
82
schizophrenia-like illness.8 ' The drugs elicit an initial sedation, followed by an antipsychotic effect which modifies such symptoms of
schizophrenia as thought disorders, autism, hallucinations, delusions,
and paranoid ideation.33 Their use is thought to be valuable in the
treatment of these illnesses, relieving the symptoms on a short-term and
27. Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, THE PHARBASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 152 (L. Goodman & A. Gilman, eds.)

MACOLOGICAL

(1975). The drugs also provide the parallel benefits of shortening patients'
hospital stays and allowing them to function in the community. See Winick,
Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH 1. 769, 773-74 (1977); Zander, Prolixin Decanoate: A Review of the
Research, 2 MENTAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 37 (1977).
28. Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 363, 378 (1980). See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir.
1981); Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. at 2445.

The two other major categories of psychotropic medication commonly used
in the treatment of committed patients are lithium and the antidepressants.
See generally R. BALDESSARINI, CHEMOTHERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY 57-125 (1977).

Lithium operates primarily on mood, rather than thought, disorders. See id.
at 57-74. It is generally used to reduce the grandiosity, elation, and aggressiveness that characterize the manic phase of manic-depressive psychosis. Id. The
antidepressants are also used to remedy mood disorders, particularly the sense
of helplessness and despondency that characterizes psychotic depression. See
id. at 75-125.
29. The classes of antipsychotics are the phenothiazines such as Thorazine
(chloropromazine) and Prolixin (thephenazine); the thioxanthenes such as
Navane (thiothexene); and the butyrophenones such as Haldol (halopendol).
See Cole, Pharmacotheryof Psychosis, in PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY IN THE PRACTICE
OF MEDICINE 205, 206-07 (M. Jawik ed. 1977). The effects of the various classes
of antipsychotics are similar. Id. at 205; Byck, supra note 25, at 156-58. For
a discussion of these effects, see notes 44-56 & 268-72 infra.
30. For a definition of schizophrenia, see note 25 supra.
31. For a discussion of these drugs, see note 24 supra. Persons may be diagnosed as being "schizoid" or "borderline schizophrenic," the latter class of
patients not having as great a degree of schizophrenic symptoms as the former.
See Fuller & Thompson, Behavior Genetics in Schizophrenia, in PsYCHOPATHOLOGY TODAY 370, 373 (W. Sahakian ed. 1970).
32. Byck, supra note 27, at 158. As noted by one authority, if a single
dose of 100 milligrams of chlorpromazine is given to a normal subject, the
subject will experience a fall in blood pressure, tachycardia (increased heart
rate), a slight decrease in respiratory rate, decreased salivary secretion, miosis
(constriction of the pupils), and decreased motor activity. Id. The subject
will sit in silence and show an indifference to those stimuli that would arouse
him under normal circumstances. Id.

33.

FRAZER & WINOKUR, THERAPEUTIC AND PHARMACOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF

BIOLOGICAL BASES OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 155 (1977).
According to many medical authorities, the antipsychotic effect of the drugs
may take several weeks to develop fully. Id. at 156.
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS,
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occasionally long-term basis. 34 Antipsychotics often make it possible to
shorten the period of confinement and make the patients more man85
ageable and less of a threat to themselves and others.
Antipsychotics are, however, not generally considered cures for
schizophrenia; 38 patients frequently relapse when taken off the medication, 7 and, while some patients may experience relief from certain
symptoms of the disease, they may continue to experience decreased
initiative, vague thinking, and residual paranoia.38
The task of deciding which drugs to prescribe for specific conditions has proven to be difficult for researchers.8 9 The results of various
attempts to pair particular phenothiazines, 40 for example, with individual symptoms, have been inconclusive.41 Furthermore, problems
also remain in determining the specific dosage that should be given to
the patient.42 In practice, "[d]rugs are chosen by custom and rumored
repute, and dosage is commonly adjusted upward until the patient
either responds or develops toxic symptoms." 43
The potential side effects that accompany treatment with antipsychotic drugs are many. The patient may experience an increased
heart rate, nasal congestion, blurred vision, constipation, drowsiness,
fluctuation of temperature, or altered skin pigmentation. 44 Orthostatic
or postural hypotension, resulting in dizziness, weakness, or fainting
when the patient stands up, may also be caused by the use of antipsychotics. 45 Furthermore, the drugs may affect appetite, libido, and
34. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 845.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 378.
37. Cole, supra note 29, at 211.

38. Id. at 210. For a discussion of the dispute surrounding the effectiveness of antipsychotic drugs on various forms of schizophrenia, see Rhoden,

supra note 28, at 378 n.77.

39. Plotkin, supra note 5, at 475.
40. For a discussion of phenothiazines, see note 29 supra. Phenothiazines
are the most commonly prescribed class of antipsychotics. Hollister, Drug
Therapy: Mental Disorders-Antipsychotic and Antimaniac Drugs, 286 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 984, 984 (1972).

41. See Ploktin, supra note 5, at 475.

Compare Hollister, Clincial Use of

PsychotherapeuticDrugs; Current Status, 10 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 171-72 (1969) (the sedative phenothiazines were effective on agitated

patients; less sedative drugs worked best with symptoms of withdrawal and
retardation) with National Institute of Mental Health Psychopharmacology
Research Branch Collaborative Study Group, Differences in Clinical Effects of
Three Phenothiazines in "Acute" Schizophrenia, 28 DISEASES NERVOUS Sys. 369,
381 (1967) (Chloropromazine is more effective for core symptoms such as
apathy and retardation).
42. See Plotkin, supra note 5, at 474-75.
43. May, Van Putten, Yale, Potepan, Jenden, Fairchild, Goldstein & Dixon,
Predicting Individual Responses to Drug Treatment in Schizophrenia: A Test
Dose Model, 162 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 177, 177-78 (1976).

44. Byck, supra note 27, at 164-65.
45. Rhoden, supra note 28, at 380.
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the secretion of certain hormones. 46 Blood dyscrasias (which increase
susceptibility to infection), allergic reactions, and jaundice are complications which occur less frequently, but nevertheless are potentially
serious. 47 Other infrequent, but serious, nonmuscular side effects,
such as skin rash and skin discoloration, 48 ocular changes, 49 cardiovascular changes,5 0 and occasionally, sudden death,51 have also been
documented.
Antipsychotic drugs may also cause abnormalities in the patient's
motor activity, known as extrapyramidal side effects.5 2 The most common of these side effects, which are temporary and disappear when
the drug is terminated, are dystonic reactions, akathisia, and parkinsonism. 53 Dystonic reactions are manifested by muscle spasms, especially
in the eyes, neck, face, and arms, or in irregular flexing, writhing or
grimacing movements, or protrusion of the tongue. 54 Akathisia refers
to an inability to stay still, restlessness, and agitation, and parkinsonism
is manifested by a mask-like face, drooling, muscle stiffness and rigidity,
a shuffling gait, and tremors. 5
A more serious side effect, which is potentially permanent, is tardive
diskinesia, which is characterized by rythmic, repetitive, and involun46. Byck, supra note 27, at 164.
47. Id.
48. Greiner & Berry, Skin Pigmentation and Corneal and Lens Opacities
with Prolonged Chloropromazine Therapy, 90 CAN. MED. A.J. 663 (1964).
49. De Long, Incidence and Significance of Chloropromazine-Induced
Eye Changes, 29 DISEASES NERVOUS Sys. 19 (Supp. 1968); Shader, Appleton &
DiMascio, Ophthalmalogical (Pigmentary) Changes, PSYCHOTROPic DRUG SIDE
EFFECTS 107 (1970); Siddall, Ocular Complications Related to Phenothiazines,
29 DISEASES NERVOUS SYS. 10 (Supp. 1968).
50. Ayd, CardiovascularEffects of Phenothiazines, 5 INT'L DRUG THERAPY
NEWSLETTER 1 (1970); Graupner, Murphree & Meduna, Electrocardiographic
Changes Associated with the Use of Thioridazine, 5 J. NEUROPSYCH. 344

(1964).
51. Crane, supra note 5, at 126; Hollister & Kosek, Sudden Death During
Treatment with Phenothiazine Derivatives, 192 J. A.M.A. 1035 (1965); Moore
& Book, Sudden Death in Phenothiazine Therapy, 44 PSYCH. Q. 389 (1970);
Richardson, Graupner & Richardson, IntramyocardialLesions in Patients Dying
Suddenly and Unexpectedly, 195 J. A.M.A. 254 (1966).

52. Byck, supra note 27, at 168.
53. See, e.g., Ayd, A Survey of Drug-Induced Extrapyramidal Reactions,

175 J. A.M.A. 1054 (1961); Brandon, McClelland, & Protheave, A Study of
Facial Dyskinesia in a Mental Hospital Population, 118 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 171

(1971); Byck, supra note 27, at 169; Crane, supra note 5, at 124; Eisenberg,
Psychiatric Intervention, 229 SCIENTIFIC AM. 116, 121 (Sept. 1973); Hollister,
Adverse Reactions to Phenothiazines, 189 J. A.M.A. 311 (1964); Hollister,

supra note 40, at 985; Kennedy, Hershon & McGuire, Extrapyramidal Disorders After Prolonged Phenothiazine Therapy, 118 BRIT. J. PsycH. 509 (1971).
54. See authorities cited in note 53 supra.
55. Id.
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tary movements of the tongue, face, mouth, and jaw, and sometimes
accompanied by other bizzare muscular activity. 56
While treatment with psychotropic drugs may be effective in controlling and treating certain mental patients on a short-term basis,
the cost associated with the use of these drugs may be high because
they involve the risk to the patient of serious side effects, both temporary and permanent. State interests in controlling and treating
mental patients may on occasion be achieved by courses of treatment
which are less detrimental to the patient. For example, different drugs,
smaller dosages, or different therapies may be effective in treating the
patient while not resulting in these serious side effects. 57 Alternatives
to drug treatment may encompass counseling techniques such as psychotherapy, milieu therapy, or behavior modification, or may simply take
the form of physical restraint or seclusion in times of danger. 58
The fact that mental patients have asserted a right to refuse treatment with psychotropic drugs illustrates that there are problems in
their use. While the decision as to a particular course of treatment is
a medical question, recent cases have recognized that under certain
circumstances the mental patient may have a right to refuse treatment.5 9
These cases have defined the scope of that right with reference to a
number of factors, including the physical danger posed by the patient,
the patient's mental competency, the risk of side effects, and the availability of less restrictive treatments. 60
The existence of a less detrimental alternative course of treatment
necessarily puts the judiciary in the role of reviewing medical decisions
of the psychiatrist. The appropriateness of such a review is the central
issue in the debate over whether the least restrictive alternative doctrine should be used to define the scope of the right to refuse treatment.61
56. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. at 1138. For a further discussion of
tardive dyskinesia, see Bell & Smith, Tardive Dyskinesia: Characterizationand
Prevalence in Statewide System, 29 J. CLIN. PSYCH. 39 (1978); Rhoden, supra
note 28, at 381.
57. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 847; See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.
Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
58. For a discussion of psychotherapy, milieu therapy and behavior
modification, and their effectiveness, see Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental
Patients, 45 S.

CAL.

L. REV. 616, 619-23, 626-31 (1972).

See also Davis v.

Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 921 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (rejection of the use of
physical restraint and seclusion in connection with the administration of
psychotropic drugs).
59. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Okin,
634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers,
102 S.Ct. 2442 (1982).
60. See notes 84-99 & 142-55 and accompanying text infra.
61. See notes 170-284 and accompanying text infra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

III. THE RIGHT

TO REFUSE

[VOL. 28: p. 101

TREATMENT: DEFINING ITS SCOPE

A. Recognition of a Right to Refuse Treatment:
Rennie v. Klein
In Rennie v. Klein,6 2 the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, was directly confronted with the issue of the mental patient's right to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs and the task of defining the scope
of that right. On December 22, 1977, John Rennie, an involuntarily
committed mental patient at the Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, a state
institution in New Jersey, brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the hospital and the
New Jersey State Department of Human Services. 63 Rennie sought a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the psychiatrists and officials at the
hospital from forcibly administering psychotropic drugs to him in the
absence of an emergency situation. 64 Rennie claimed that the forced
administration of drugs constituted an invasion of his constitutional
right to refuse medication in non-emergency circumstances. 65
62. 633 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
63. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (D.N.J. 1978), modified,
476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1978, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3059 (1981), modified
and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). The complaint was grounded
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Id. The
plaintiff's section 1983 claim challenged a New Jersey statute which specifically
provided that voluntary patients may refuse medication, and, by implication,
that involuntary patients may not. Id. at 1142.
The New Jersey statute provided in pertinent part:
No medication shall be administered unless at the written order of a
physician. Notation of each patient's medication shall be kept in his
treatment records. At least weekly, the attending physician shall review the drug regimen of each patient under his care. All physicians'
orders or prescriptions shall be written with a termination date, which
shall not exceed 30 days. Medication shall not be used as punishment, for the convenience of staff, as a substitute for a treatment program, or in quantities that interfere with the patient's treatment
program. Voluntarily committed patients shall have the right to
refuse medication.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(d)(1) (West 1981).
64. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. at 1134. Rennie had been variously
diagnosed during his frequent admissions to the hospital as a schizophrenic
and manic-depressive. Id. at 1135-36. For discussion of these illnesses, see
notes 25 8c 26 supra. Rennie was treated during these various admissions to
Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, starting in 1973, with several psychotropic drugs
including Thorazine, Lithium, Prolixin Decanoate, Etrafon, Haldol, and Elavil.
462 F. Supp. at 1135-36. Psychotropic drugs are used by mental hospitals to
alter and control patients' behavior, moods, and thought processes, in the
hope of making them more manageable. For a complete discussion of the use
of psychotropic drugs, see notes 24-56 supra. Rennie suffered from a number
of common side effects of the psychotropic drugs, and had at various times
objected to their use. 462 F. Supp. at 1140-41. For a discussion of the side
effects associated with psychotropic drugs, see notes 44-56 supra & notes 26872 and accompanying text infra.
65. 462 F. Supp. at 1134. Rennie charged the defendants with violations
of four rights: 1) the right to refuse medication in non-emergency circum-
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The district court held that involuntarily confined mental patients
have a qualified constitutional right to refuse psychotropic medication. 6 The court initially outlined three factors to be considered in
determining whether institutional personnel have deprived a patient
of his qualified right to refuse treatment: 1) the patient's physical
threat to other patients and staff at the institution; 2) the patient's
competence to make treatment -decisions himself; and 3) the existence
of less restrictive alternative treatments. 67 In a subsequent hearing, 68
stances; 2) the right to treatment; 3) the right to access to counsel; and 4) the
right to be free from physical abuse while in custody. Id. The right to
refuse medication was the only issue considered by the parties on Rennie's
motion for preliminary injunction. Id.
66. Id. at 1145-48. The court based this conclusion on the constitutional
right to privacy which it determined was "broad enough to include the right
to protect one's own mental processes from governmental interference." Id.
at 1144. The court rejected the argument by the plaintiff that the forcible
treatment of psychotropic drugs constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment, finding that the drugs are an established medical treatment for schizophrenia and were justifiably administered
as treatment for Rennie. Id. at 1143. For an analysis of the eighth amendment implications of the coercive administration of psychotropic drugs, see
Symonds, Mental Patients: Right to Refuse Drugs; Involuntary Medication as
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 701 (1980). The
court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the forcible administration of
mind-altering drugs violated his first amendment right to freedom of thought.
462 F. Supp. at 1143-44. But cf. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental
Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. July 10, 1973),
reprinted in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
902 (1974) (involuntarily confined mental patient could not give legally adequate consent to experimental procedure of psychosurgery because of first
amendment protection of the freedom to generate ideas). The Rennie district court distinguished the Kaimowitz holding, reasoning that Rennie's ability
to perform on intelligence tests had not been impaired by the use of the
drugs, that he desired to be cured of his mental illness, and that the use of
anti-psychotic drugs does not cause irreversible personality change, as does
psychosurgery, and thus does not permanently constrict the patients' freedom
of thought. 462 F. Supp. at 1144. For a discussion of the freedom of
thought as a basis for the right to refuse psychotropic drugs, see Rhoden,
supra note 28, at 388-96.
67. 462 F. Supp. at 1145-47. Within the element of the least restrictive
alternative, the court included the risk of side effects. Id. at 1146-47. For
example, if a patient were likely to contract tardive dyskenisia through administration of psychotropic drugs, involuntary medication would not be
permitted. Id. at 1146. However, in a subsequent phase of the Rennie litigation, the district court treated these issues as separate factors. See Rennie v.
Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (D.N.J. 1979) cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 3059
(1981), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
68. The first Rennie district court opinion covered multiple hearings.
The court's decision that involuntarily confined mental patients have a qualified right to refuse psychotropic medication was made on November 9, 1978.
462 F. Supp. at 1131. Subsequent hearings and findings by the court on a
motion for preliminary injunction, after the court's decision on November
9, 1978, are reported in the same opinion, which was issued on December 12,
1978. Id. Because of the court's decision on November 9, 1978, Rennie was
no longer being forcibly medicated. Id. at 1148 n.6. Therefore, the court
did not grant the subsequent motion for an injunction. Id. at 1148. How-
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the district court applied a four-factor analysis adding the element of
the risk of permanent side effects from the proposed treatment. 69 The
district court, however, denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction against the forcible administration of psychotropic drugs
on the grounds that the plaintiff was "floridly psychotic" and assaultive,
that his capacity to make treatment decisions was limited, and that no
treatment less intrusive than antipsychotic medication would stabilize
70

his condition.
The action was subsequently expanded into a class action on behalf of all persons committed in New Jersey mental health facilities
and upon a third hearing of the case, 71 the district court prescribed
specific due process procedures to be followed in order to protect the
committed patient's qualified right to refuse medication. 72 The court
issued a preliminary injunction which required the following procedures. First, the hospital was required to inform the patients of
their right to refuse psychotropic medication, and of the side effects
which may accompany the use of the drug.73 Furthermore, whenever
74
If
possible, written consent must be obtained prior to treatment.
the patient refused to give written consent, and if the involuntary
patient was declared legally incompetent or certified "functionally incompetent" (unable to provide knowledgeable consent) by a treating
physician, the decision to forcibly medicate the patient must be referred to a patient advocate who may, at his discretion, request a hearing before an independent psychiatrist.7 5 For involuntary patients
ever, shortly after the first decision on November 9, 1978, the plaintiff's condition worsened and the hospital reinstituted forcible medication. Id. at 115152. The plaintiff subsequently renewed his motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1153.
69. Id. at 1152.
70. Id. at 1153.
71. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modifying, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J.
1978). This hearing was treated with a separate opinion. It was prompted
by the plaintiff's amended complaint which added class action allegations.
The district court certified subclasses of those patients voluntarily committed
to New Jersey institutions and those persons involuntarily committed to those
institutions. A number of named plaintiffs from various state mental hospitals also intervened. Id. at 1296.
72. Id. at 1307-08. The court based these specific procedures on its
earlier constitutional finding of a qualified right to refuse treatment. Id. at
1307. For a discussion of the court's earlier holding, see notes 66-70 supra.
73. 476 F. Supp. at 1307.
74. Id. at 1307, 1313-15. Involuntary patients who have been declared
legally incompetent may be medicated without written consent if proper consent is obtained from a legal guardian. Id. at 1314.
75. Id. at 1314. The independent psychiatrist and patient advocate
would be appointed by the Commissioner of the Department of Human
Services. Id. at 1311-12. Representation of the patient by an attorney would
be permitted, but not required. Id. at 1314. At such hearings, the court
concluded that the four factors outlined in its previous decision must be the
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not declared legally or functionally incompetent and who refused to
consent, a hearing and a written opinion by the independent psychiatrist was required to precede any forcible medication. 76 However, in
"emergency situations," a voluntarily or involuntarily committed patient could be forcibly medicated without any due process hearing.77
Emergency situations are defined as those in which there is a "sudden,
significant change in the patient's condition which creates danger to
the patient himself or to others in the hospital." 78
On appeal,7 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting en banc,8 0 modified and remanded, holding that 1)
mental patients who are involuntarily committed to state institutions
nevertheless retain a constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs; 81
2) the state may not override that right without affording the patient a
due process hearing except in emergency situations; 82 and 3) the inbasis for any decision to override the patient's privacy right. Id. at 1314-15.
See text accompanying note 52 supra.
76. 476 F. Supp. at 1314.
77. Id. at 1313. In an emergency, medication can be forcibly administered for up to 72 hours. Id. If the "threat to life or limb continues,"
certification by the medical director of the hospital may extend this period
an additional 72 hours. Id. at 1313-14.
78. Id. at 1313.
79. Id. at 1294.
80. 653 F.2d at 836. Both parties cross-appealed from the district court
order of September 4, 1979 reported at 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979).
Id. at 840. The defendants first contended that the district court erred in
recognizing a constitutional right to refuse treatment and, in the alternative,
that the procedures embodied in the New Jersey administrative bulletin
which addressed the administration of psychotropic drugs were sufficient to
protect any such right. Id. The plaintiffs asserted that the relief ordered
by the district court was inadequate, and that "independent psychiatrists retained by and responsible to the Commissioner of the Department of Human
Services cannot be the neutral decision makers required by the due process
clause." Id. They further questioned the due process effectiveness of the
system of patient advocates who, like the independent psychiatrists, would be
retained by and responsible to the defendant Commissioner. Id. Finally,
the "plaintiffs challenge[d]
the portion of the district court's order that
permit[ted] a doctor to medicate the patient by declaring him to be 'functionally incompetent,' a procedure they claimed would allow the circumvention of the mandatory review of all refusals of medication." Id.
The case was initially argued on April 22, 1980 before Judges Aldisert,
Weis and Garth. Id. at 838. It was subsequently reargued en banc on May
12, 1981 before Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Aldisert, Adams, Gibbons,
Hunter, Weis, Garth, Higginbotham, and Sloviter. judge Weis wrote the
majority opinion. Id. Judges Adams, Higginbotham, and Sloviter concurred. Id. Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Aldisert, Hunter, and Garth
concurred in part. Id. at 838, 855. Judge Gibbons concurred in part and
dissented in part from the judgment. Id. at 838, 865.
81. Id. Only the antipsychotics, one subclass of the psychotropic drugs,
were the subject of the court's opinion. Id. at 839 n.2. For a discussion
of the various classes of psychotropic drugs, see note 21 supra.
82. 653 F.2d at 838. The court defined emergency situations as those
in which the "patient is a danger to himself or others." Id.
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formal administrative procedure already established by New Jersey
Department of Human Services met the constitutional standards of
due process.8s
1. Substantive Due Process Right to Refuse Treatment
The Third Circuit originally determined that there are two sources
from which a substantive liberty interest 84 can be derived: state law
and the federal Constitution.S5 The court concluded that New Jersey
law did not create such a liberty interest in involuntarily committed
mental patients.86 The court reached this conclusion by noting that
New Jersey, which had by statute affirmatively recognized the right of
voluntarily committed patients to refuse medication,8 T had failed to
recognize an equivalent right in those who are involuntarily committed.88
Having found no substantive right to refuse in state law, the court
turned to a federal constitutional analysis in determining whether the
Constitution creates a liberty interest in involuntarily committed mental patients to refuse antipsychotic drugs. The Third Circuit initially
addressed the defendant's argument that an involuntary commitment
extinguishes the freedom to refuse medication normally possessed by
an individual.89 The court rejected this argument, holding that the
patient has a substantive constitutional right to refuse medication
based on the right to be free from unjustified intrusions of personal
83. Id. at 838.
84. 653 F.2d at 841 n.6. Unlike the district court, which characterized
the right as a privacy interest, the Third Circuit, noting that nothing of significance turned on the choice of characterization, concluded that the right to
refuse treatment was better viewed as a liberty interest. For a discussion
of the district court's characterization of the interest, see notes 66-67 and
accompanying text supra.
85. 653 F.2d at 841-42. The court rejected the defendant's argument
that because no liberty interest exists in state law, plaintiffs have no liberty
interest. Id. at 842. In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that to
conclude otherwise would place a state's statutory law above the Constitution.
Id.
86. Id. at 842. For the text of the relevant statute and a discussion of
its implication that involuntarily committed patients have no right to refuse
medication, see note 63 supra.
87. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(d)(1) (West 1981) ("voluntarily committed patients shall have the right to refuse medication.")). For
the relevant text of this statute, see note 63 supra.
88. 653 F.2d at 842 (citing In re B, 156 N.J. Super. 231, 383 A.2d 760
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977)). The court noted that a New Jersey trial
court had held that the implication of the statute was that involuntarily
committed patients do not have the right to refuse medication. Id.
89. 653 F.2d at 843. The defendants argued that involuntary commitment takes away all aspects of a person's liberty interest. Id.
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security under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 90
In support of its holding, the court, drawing an analogy to a prison
setting, emphasized that compulsory medication of a nonconsenting
patient, with its serious risks, must be deemed a "major change in
the conditions of confinement" and, therefore, a liberty deprivation
of the patient.9 1
2. Defining the Scope of the Right to Refuse: The Least Intrusive
Means Standard
Having concluded that there exists a constitutional right "to be
free from treatment that poses substantial risks to [one's] well being", 92
the Third Circuit proceeded to consider the scope of that right. The
court recognized that such a right is not absolute, but must be limited
by legitimate governmental concerns and obligations such as protecting the public, property, and the person himself.93 Five members of
the court concluded that the deprivation of liberty imposed by the
state as the result of the medication of patients with antipsychotic
drugs "must not exceed that required by needed care or legitimate
administrative concerns" and must be the "least intrusive infringement"
available. 94 The court defined the least intrusive means standard as
90. Id. at 843-44 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)). The
court noted that "the patient's liberty is diminished only to the extent necessary to allow for confinement by the state so as to prevent him from being

a danger to himself or to others". Id. at 843. All nine members of the en
banc panel concurred in this holding. Id. at 838.
91. 653 F.2d at 843. The Third Circuit drew an analogy to Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, the Supreme Court had held that
in the prison setting, the imposition of solitary confinement "represents a

major change in the conditions of confinement" which implicated the necessity

of procedural due process safeguards to protect against an arbitrary imposition of such a sanction. Id. at 571-72 n.19. In support of this determination, the court relied upon evidence in the record which showed that numerous disorders of the central nervous system may be created by the use of
antipsychotic drugs. 653 F.2d at 843-44. For a discussion of the effects of
antipsychotic drugs, see notes 44-53 and accompanying text supra and notes

268-72 and accompanying text inIra.
92. 653 F.2d at 844-45.

93. Id. at 845. The court relied upon evidence in the record which
demonstrated the value of antipsychotic drugs in the treatment of certain
mental illnesses and in relieving symptoms accompanying those illnesses. The
court noted that the use of the drugs serves legitimate state concerns and
obligations by often making it possible to drastically shorten the period of
confinement and by making patients more manageable, and, therefore, less of
a threat to others. Id.
94. Id. The court further explained that "[t]he means chosen to promote
the state's substantial concerns must be carefully tailored to effectuate those

objectives with minimal infringement of protected interests."

Id. at 846

(citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)). The court found
support for its least restrictive analysis in a decision by another federal court
of appeals as well as in Congressional and state legislation. Id. at 846-47
n.13 (citing Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9401-
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not prohibiting all intrusions into a patient's personal liberty, but,
rather, as requiring avoidance of those intrusions "which are unnecessary or whose cost benefit ratios, weighed from the patient's standpoint,
are unacceptable." 95 The court noted that hourly or daily judicial
96
Rather, it
oversight is obviously unworkable and is not required.
of treatchoice
the
defined the issue of judicial review as "whether
ment strikes a proper balance between efficacy and intrusiveness." 97
In this balancing process, the court would require that the psychiatrist determine whether a different drug, a smaller dosage, or a different therapy would serve the interests of both the patient and the
state.98 Finally, the court noted that the psychiatrist may be granted
more discretion in emergency situations requiring the medication of
patients. 99
3. Protection of the Right to Refuse Through Procedural Safeguards.
The Third Circuit next examined the appropriateness of the procedures imposed by the district court for the protection of the right
to refuse. The court found that existing procedures established by the
New Jersey Department of Human Services complied with due process
requirements, and thus held that the additional requirements imposed by the district court were unnecessary.1 00 The court initially
noted that the legal standard applicable in determining whether the
existing procedural safeguards afforded the patient would pass constitutional muster is that formulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Matthews v. Eldridge.10' In Matthews, the Court listed three
9503 (Supp. IV 1980); S. REP. No. 112, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 77, reprinted in

1980 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD.

NEWS

3372).

The court also noted the pervasive

factor of medical judgment in cases of this type, but concluded, in accord
with Supreme Court precedent, that "'[t]he medical nature of the inquiry
. . . does not justify dispensing with due process requirements.'" 653 F.2d
at 847 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980)).
95. 653 F.2d at 847.
96. Id. The court required a careful balancing of the interests furthered
by administering the drug against the interests of the patient. Id.
97. Id. In search of the proper balance, the court noted that it would

depend on medical and psychiatric opinion.

Id. This dependence on pro-

fessional opinion, reasoned the court, would notify the "psychiatric community" that a "conscious weighing of the constitutional liberty interest in

any determination of proper treatment alternatives is necessary."

Id.

98. Id.

99. Id. In explanation of this point, the court noted that treatment
with antipsychotic drugs for a limited period of time is not as likely to have
as intrusive an effect upon the patient as the administration of the drugs for
an extended time, and, therefore, the least intrusive standard is generally
applicable to a "regimen or treatment program," rather than to individual
dosages. Id. at 847-48. The court also emphasized that the emergency treatment provisions were not at issue in Rennie. Id. at 848.
100. Id.
101. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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factors to be considered in determining whether state agency proceedings comply with due process: 1) the private liberty interest; 2) the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest through the procedures used, as well as the value of any additional or substituted
procedural safeguards; and 3) the governmental interest, including the
activity involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedural requirements would impose.102 Applying the three
factors enunciated in Matthews, the Third Circuit analyzed the procedures established by New Jersey 103 in order to determine their con10 4
stitutionality.
In discussing the first Matthews factor, the Rennie court indicated
that it had found a significant private liberty interest of the patient
implicated in the right of refusal. 06
Under the second Matthews
factor, the court held that the New Jersey procedures, whereby the
hospital medical staff makes the decision to compel medication only
after consultation with the patient and supervisory personnel, 106 posed
only a minor risk of erroneous deprivation of personal liberty because
of the staff's close connection with the patient and his treatment pro
gram, and their knowledge of his medical history. 107 The court additionally found that the risk of an erroneous deprivation would not be
significantly reduced by further imposing the requirement of an adversary hearing wherein an independent psychiatrist would determine
whether the patient's refusal of medication should be honored,108 as
102. 424 U.S. at 335. The Rennie court noted that any due process procedures promulgated must provide an opportunity for the exercise of professional medical judgment with respect to various matters, including the likelihood of violence on the part of the patient, his previous reaction to acute
psychotropic drugs, the duration of previous drug therapy, and other factors
as well. 653 F.2d at 848. Furthermore, the court recognized that the existence of these factors and their varied application to different patients
required that the decision to administer drugs be made on an individualized
basis. Id.
103. See 653 F.2d at 840. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1 (West 1981)
(legislation regulating treatment of mentally ill). See also Administrative
Bulletin 78-3. The Bulletin sets up a procedural mechanism through which
a decision to administer drugs against a patient's wishes is made and reviewed.
653 F.2d at 848-49. For a discussion of this procedural mechanism, see notes
106-12 and accompanying text infra.
104. 653 F.2d at 848-51.
105. Id. at 850. For a discussion of this liberty interest, see notes 85-91
and accompanying text supra.
106. See 653 F.2d at 840. The attending psychiatrist's decision to compel
medication is reviewed by the medical director. Id.
107. Id. at 850. The court concluded that the weeks or months spent by
a*patient in the institution should provide a more accurate and reliable basis
for the staff's judgment as to the patients' condition and needs than would
an ad hoc decision by an independent psychiatrist whose experience with the
patient would be limited. Id.
108. The Rennie court concluded the "adversary contest implicit in the
district court's order" was ill-suited to the medical determination that must
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mandated by the district court. 109 In discussing the third Matthews
factor, the court observed that great expenditures of staff time at the
hospitals and substantial financial burdens on the state 110 would be imposed by implementation of the procedures mandated by the district
court."' The court found that this element, more than the others,
counseled its approval of the New Jersey procedures and its rejection
2
of the procedural safeguards mandated by the district court."1
be made.

Id.

The court based this conclusion on the Supreme Court's

rationale in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
that it did not accept

The court in Parham stated

the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided
by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional
tools of medical science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing. Even after a hearing, the
nonspecialist decisionmaker must make a medical-psychiatric decision.

Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the
supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the
appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than
real.
Id. at 609.
109. For a discussion of the due process procedures ordered by the district court, see notes 71-78 and accompanying text supra. The Rennie court
also addressed the district court's concern about the independence of the
doctors and officials responsible for representing the patient's interests when
the need for a decision to medicate arises. 653 F.2d at 850. The Third
Circuit, relying on Supreme Court decisions in "analogous contexts," found
that there was "no due process violation in the use of such decisionmakers
employed by and responsible to the state bureaucracies." Id. (citing Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979);
Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974)). The Rennie court supported
its conclusion by noting that 1) to rule otherwise would be to "void almost
all intra-administrative appeals where institutional pressures abound;" and
2) "the New .Jersey provision for retaining an outside psychiatrist in certain
circumstances tends to blunt the district court's concern that institutional pressure will prevent an independent decision." The provision states that if the
medical director desires to avoid institutional influences, he is empowered to
call upon a disinterested authority for the final decision. 653 F.2d at 850-51.
110. 653 F.2d at 851. The court concluded that the district court's order
would impose "substantial additional financial burdens" on the state. Id.
111. Id. The court stated that these financial burdens would result in
the diversion of funds from the finite resources available for the care of the
mentally ill to the financing of non-essential administrative procedures which
would not provide help for the patient's most critical needs. Id. The court
further reasoned that these adversary proceedings would be counterproductive, creating stress which would interfere with the successful, long-range
treatment of the mentally ill. Id. (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 616
(1979)).
112. In rejecting the adoption of adversary proceedings, the court, noting
the marginal utility of these proceedings to patients, necessarily discarded the
district court's holding requiring behavioral experts, such as psychiatrists, in
such proceedings. 653 F.2d at 851 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606
(1979)). For a discussion of the procedures mandated by the district court,
see notes 71-78 and accompanying text supra.
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B. The Case Against the Least Restrictive Alternative:
The Rennie Concurrences
Four members of the Rennie court were vehemently opposed to the
majority's adoption of the least restrictive alternative doctrine.113 Although agreeing that the mental patient has a substantive constitutional
right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs, they argued that the
least restrictive alternative doctrine was an inappropriate factor to
114
define the scope of that right.
Chief Judge Seitz, while concurring in part, 1 5 dissented from the
majority's application of the least restrictive alternative standard 18
to both the procedural and the substantive due process issues presented."17 Chief Judge Seitz concluded that "the least restrictive alternative standard is irrelevant to a determination of the sufficiency" of
the New Jersey procedures "because such a standard does not assist
in the determination of what procedures are required to protect a
patient's right to refuse medication." "18 Further, Chief Judge Seitz
determined that the least restrictive alternative standard, as applied by
the majority to the substantive due process rights of involuntarily committed mental patients, was inappropriately and improperly used, since
the Constitution does not require such an impingement on the professional judgment of the psychiatrist in the treatment of patients.19
Chief Judge Seitz concluded that the applicable constitutional standard
governing a patient's right to refuse and the state's ability to override that right should be whether the psychiatrist's treatment "substantial[ly] depart[ed] from accepted professional judgment." 120
113. Chief Judge Seitz, and Judges Aldisert, Garth, and Hunter were
opposed to the least restrictive alternative doctrine.
114. See notes 115-31 and accompanying text infra.
115. 653 F.2d at 854 (Seitz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Chief Judge Seitz concurred with the finding of a qualified constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medication, based on the liberty interest
contained in the due process clause; the upholding of the constitutionality
of the New Jersey administrative procedures; and the majority's decision to
modify throtigh remand, rather than to vacate the preliminary injunction
issued by the district court. Id. Judge Aldisert joined in Chief Judge Seitz's
opinion. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 854-55 (Seitz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 854 (Seitz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119. Id. at 854-55 (Seitz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Chief Judge Seitz stated that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised." Id. (quoting
Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and
remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2952 (1982)). For a discussion of Romeo, see notes 180-87
and accompanying text infra. Furthermore, Chief Judge Seitz concluded that
it was inappropriate for the court to choose among acceptable professional
choices. Id.
120. 653 F.2d at 855 (Seitz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Chief Judge Seitz questioned how the risk of permanent side effects

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 28: p. 101

Judge Garth, joined by two other judges, also concurred with the
majority's finding of a right to refuse treatment,12' but concluded that
neither the least restrictive alternative treatment factor nor the risk of
side effects factor should be applied in a constitutional analysis of
the patient's right to refuse treatment. 122 Judge Garth asserted that
the state may administer antipsychotic drugs in the face of the patient's refusal only when the state demonstrates either that 1) the
medication is necessary to prevent the patient from posing a danger
to himself or to others, or 2) the patient does not have the mental
capacity to make a rational decision with respect to medication, irrespective of whether the treatment program adopted is the least restrictive or whether risks of permanent side effects are present.'23
In addition, Judge Garth specifically dissented from the majority's
holding that any medical treatment program, as opposed to an individual dosage, to be constitutionally adequate, must be the least
restrictive. 124 Judge Garth argued that the least restrictive alternative
fits into the constitutional analysis, and concluded that, although side effects
alone were of no independent constitutional significance, they should be
considered along with other relevant factors in determining whether accepted
professional judgment was exercised. Id.
121. 653 F.2d at 855 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judges Aldisert and Hunter joined in the opinion.
122. Id. judge Garth concluded that the majority accepted the four
constitutional factors applied by the district court in its determination of the
patient's right to refuse treatment: "1) does the patient constitute a physical
threat to other patients and to staff at the institution; 2) does the patient
have the capacity to decide on his own particular treatment; 3) do any less
restrictive treatments exist; and 4) are there risks of permanent side effects
from the proposed treatment." Id. Judge Garth noted that the majority
emphasized the third factor in its constitutional analysis of patients' right to
refuse medication. Id. at 855-56 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
123. Id. at 858 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id. at 860 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Garth first noted that the record of the district court, by which the
majority was bound, presented "no evidence of a choice between major courses
of treatment, nor . . . of any major course of treatment that was considered
as an alternative to the psychotropic drug treatment by which Rennie was
medicated." Id. Judge Garth stated that he did not feel free to hypothesize
differing circumstances which might "trigger the formulation of a constitutional
standard." Id. (citing Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. at 1140). Moreover,
he stated that the district court held that Rennie received drug treatment that
was both indicated and required. Id. He also noted the district court's
thorough analysis of the plaintiff's condition, psychotropic drugs and their
effects, and the appropriate medication for the plaintiff given his condition.
Id. Given this analysis, Judge Garth concluded that the district court formulated its least restrictive standard in a setting involving individual dosages,
but that the majority interpreted this in terms of courses of treatment. Id.
at 861 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Regardless of
the differing characterizations, Judge Garth thought that any attempt to construct a least restrictive alternative test in an area requiring medical judgment was unsound. He further pointed out that, on this reasoning, the
Romeo court (on which the majority relied in adopting the least restrictive
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approach would involve the district courts in the review of highly
individualized treatment programs on a continuing basis and that this
review would drastically interfere with the administration of needed
medication and therapy. 125 Moreover, he stated "the imposition of
such a standard would as a practical matter require each district court
judge to exchange his robe for a medical gown" and impose upon
each judge the duties of a "super-diagnostician" and "super-physician"
for each institutionalized patient. 26 He ultimately concluded that the
determination as to the proper course of treatment is a decision best
left to the medical profession and in which the judiciary should not
7
interfere.12
alternative standard) expressly labeled the application of such a standard to
continuing treatment programs as "unsuitable." Id. at n.14 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644
F.2d 147, 166-67 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982)).
Judge Garth also accused the majority of formulating its least restrictive alternative treatment standard from cases "far removed from the context of treatment involving the mentally ill." Id. at 861 (Garth, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Judge Garth noted that the case of Shelton v. Tucher,
364 U.S. 479 (1960) relied on by the majority, involved a first amendment
attack on an Arkansas statute requiring public school teachers to annually
list all of their organizational affiliations for the preceding five years. Id.
(Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Garth also noted
that the cases giving rise to the least restrictive alternative doctrine relied upon
by the majority involved only a single legislative enactment or a discrete state
action as contrasted with the continued judicial supervision required in the
context of Rennie. 653 F.2d at 862 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's application of the least
restrictive alternative doctrine, see notes 170-212 and accompanying text infra.
125. 653 F.2d at 859 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Garth argued that courts under the majority opinion are faced with
reviewing "day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions" by hospital staff concerning the medical treatment of patients, and that such treatment is "highly
individualized" and varies markedly from patient to patient. Id. (Garth J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Garth factually supported
this observation by noting that in Rennie, the district court was "repeatedly
called upon to hold hearings and rule in a medical context on various aspects
of the plaintiff's day to day treatment." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 861 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Garth stated that
any attempt to construct a "least restrictive" constitutional standard
in an area where medical judgment should control is unsound, unworkable and unwarranted.
The many subjective determinations
that form the matrix of a medical judgment are best left to the members of the medical profession. Such determinations ought not to
involve the judiciary in an assessment, even if one can be made, as
to whether a particular mode of treatment or . . . discrete treatment,
is more or less intrusive than another.
Id.
Judge Garth also fervently disagreed with the majority's reliance on the
case of Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), in adopting the
least restrictive alternative standard in the context of the constitutional rights
of the involuntarily committed mental patient. Id. at 859-60 (Garth, J., con-
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Finally, Judge Garth indicated that the continued vitality of the
least restrictive alternative standard was questionable in light of the
recent Supreme Court decision in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,128 in which the standard was questioned in the
129
and in light
context of the statutory rights of the mentally retarded,
of the subsequent grants of certiorari in cases involving the least restrictive alternative standard in the context of the constitutional rights
8 0
of both the mentally ill and the mentally retarded.
Judge Garth also concluded that the risk of permanent side effects
factor employed by the majority had no place in the constitutional
analysis of a patient's right to refuse medication.' 31 In his view, the
curring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of the majority's
reliance on Romeo, see 653 F.2d at 846-48. For a discussion of Romeo, see
notes 200-07 and accompanying text infra. Judge Garth indicated that Romeo,
which dealt with the constitutional standards applicable to the care of mentally retarded patients in state institutions, did not address the subject of the
refusal of an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient to accept antipsychotic medication. 653 F.2d at 859 (Garth, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.) Judge Garth concluded that the Romeo record involved
the problems and characteristics of the mentally retarded patient, which, he

stated, are "critically" different from those of the mentally ill. Id. Further,
Judge Garth held that Romeo did not mandate the least restrictive alternative
standard, but instead suggested its possible application. Id.
128. 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd and remanded, 101 S. Ct.
1531 (1981). In Halderman, the Third Circuit held that the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6000, required rehabilitation of the mentally retarded in the least restrictive environment.
129. 101 S. Ct. at 1539 n.12. Justice Rehnquist indicated that it was
questionable whether the least restrictive concept was appropriate in the
setting of rehabilitation of the mentally retarded. Id.
130. 653 F.2d at 863 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded,
Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (least restrictive alternative standard
in context of rights of mentally ill) and Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147
(3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982) (least restrictive
alternative standard in context of rights of mentally retarded)). Judge Garth
thought that the likelihood of survival of the least restrictive alternative as a
constitutional standard was slight. 653 F.2d at 863 (Garth, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). In the face of the recent action by the Supreme
Court, Judge Garth reasoned that it was "wrong for the majority . . . to
factor into . . . [the] constitutional standard a doctrine which is already inappropriate and suspect .... ." Id.
In Mills v. Rogers, the United States Supreme Court never reached the
least restrictive alternative issue. 102 S. Ct. at 2442. For a discussion of
Mills, see notes 132-69 and accompanying text infra.
In Romeo v. Youngberg, the Supreme Court expressly noted that the
issue of the least restrictive alternative standard was not present in the case.
102 S. Ct. at 2457 n.15. However, it is suggested that the Court held sub
silentio that the least restrictive alternative standard is no longer constitutionally required in determining whether a breach of a mentally retarded
patient's liberty interest has occurred. Id. at 2463 (patient entitled to "reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions"). For a discussion of Romeo,
see notes 200-07 and accompanying text infra.
131. See notes 122-23 and accompanying text supra.
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state's power to administer medication which poses a risk of serious
permanent side effects is limited not by the patient's right to refuse
treatment, but, rather, by the standard of care with which the state is
charged and by the accompanying tort action available to the patient
for abuse of that standard. 13 2
C. Mills v. Rogers: A Missed Opportunity?
In Rogers v. Ohin,13s the First Circuit was confronted with an
issue identical to that of Rennie-the right to refuse treatment with
antipsychotic drugs. The First Circuit recognized a right to refuse
antipsychotic drug treatment, requiring an analysis of the likelihood
132. Id. at 864 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
so concluding, Judge Garth reasserted his position that a state may compel
medication when it demonstrates either that the patient poses a danger to
himself or to others, or that the patient does not have the mental capacity to
rationally refuse treatment. Id. Judge Garth rejected the district court's
formulation of a test which would balance the risk of permanent side effects
against both the patient's incapacity to rationally determine his course of
treatment and the danger that the patient posed to himself and others, in
determining whether the patient could refuse antipsychotic medication. Id.

Judge Garth concluded that such a balancing test "would allow the patient
to refuse medication entailing a risk of side effects even when the patient

posed a risk of harm to himself or others." Id.
Judge Gibbons, although joining the majority in its formulation of the
legal standards applicable to the involuntary imposition of medication, dissented from the majority opinion in three respects. First, he believed the
majority disregarded the trial courts factual findings. Id. at 865 (Gibbons, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Gibbons determined that
the majority simply rejected the district court conclusion that, based upon its
evaluation of all the detailed evidence and testimony, plaintiff class members were suffering irreparable harm and that, at least until the court received
further information, more protection against forced medication was required
beyond that afforded by the New Jersey procedures. Id. at 866 (Gibbons,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Second, Judge Gibbons believed that the majority departed from the

appropriate standard of review of district court discretion with respect to

pendente lite relief. He argued that the district court injunction, requiring
that independent fact finders be utilized in adversary proceedings, was consistent with Supreme Court mandates in similar factual contexts. Id. at 868
n.1 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Vitek v.

Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 589 (1979); Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
Judge Gibbons thus concluded that this aspect of the district court's ruling
should not have been rejected by the majority.
Finally, Judge Gibbons asserted that the majority confused the standard
for injunctive relief by engaging in an abstract inquiry into the appropriate
procedure for safeguarding a substantive right rather than inquiring into
whether an established pattern of illegal conduct was present in the case.
653 F.2d at 865-66, 870 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
He claimed that the majority constitutionally analyzed the New Jersey procedures on their face, without considering the record and the plaintiffs'

attack of the procedures as applied by the medical staff and other defendants.
Id.
133. 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom.
v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
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of violence by the patient, the risk of side effects, and an appraisal of
4
less restrictive alternative treatments in defining the scope of the right.13
13 5
however,
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mills v. Rogers,
quesconstitutional
the
significant
it regrettably chose not to resolve
tions as to the existence and scope of the right to refuse treatment.
Rogers involved a group of involuntary and voluntary mental patients represented in a class action to enjoin the medical staff at the
Boston State Hospital from forcibly medicating and secluding patients
in non-emergency situations. 138 The patients claimed that these hospital policies infringed upon their constitutional rights to refuse treatment. 3 7

Judge Tauro of the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order requiring
the hospital to discontinue the medication and seclusion practices without the informed consent of either the patient or his guardian if the
patient had been declared incompetent. 138 Subsequent to a lengthy
trial, the court made the order permanent. 39 Judge Tauro based his
134. 634 F.2d at 655-56. See notes 142-55 and accompanying text infra.
135. 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). For a discussion of Rogers, see notes 156-69
and accompanying text infra.
136. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360 (D. Mass. 1979) modified,
vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. at 2442. The district court certified a
class consisting of "all persons, who are presently, or will be, patients at the
May and Austin Units of Boston State Hospital and who have been or will
be secluded without their consent or medicated without their consent." Id.
1352 n.l. The medications contested were one class of psychotropic drugsthe antipsychotics. Id. at 1359-60. For a discussion of these drugs, see notes
24-56 and accompanying text supra.
137. 478 F. Supp. at 1352-53.
138. Id. at 1353. Upon admission to Boston State Hospital, voluntary
patients sign a form which states, "I understand that during my hospitalization and any after care, I will be given care and treatment which may include the injection of medicines." Id. at 1367. The defendants, the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health and officials of
the hospital, argued that voluntarily admitted patients had waived any
constitutional right to refuse treatment by signing the form. Id. The court
rejected this argument, finding that waiver of the right to refuse medication
requires that the patient must first understand that such a right exists and
then that he knowingly and explicitly waive it. Id. at 1368.
The defendants also argued that once admitted to a mental institution,
a patient is deemed incompetent to decide whether to accept treatment or
what treatment to accept in either emergency or non-emergency situations,
and, therefore, cannot assert any constitutional right to refuse treatment. Id.
at 1361. The district court rejected the incompetency argument noting that
most patients "are able to appreciate the benefits, risks, and discomfort that
may reasonably be expected from receiving psychotropic medication." Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the court also relied upon Massachusetts law,
which provides unequivocally that, although committed, a mental patient
is nonetheless presumed to be competent to manage his affairs, dispose of
property, carry on a licensed profession, and even to vote. Id. (Citing MAss.
GEI' . LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 25 (West Supp. 1970) and D.M.H. REG. § 221.02.)

139. 478 F. Supp. at 1371.
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adoption of a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs upon two constitutional rights: the penumbral right of privacy and the First Amendment
right of protection of thought.140 The court held that only in emergency
situations that create "a substantial likelihood of physical harm" to the
patient or others could medication be forcibly administered. 141
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 142 modified and remanded, holding that an involuntarily committed patient has a constitutional right to decide for himself whether
to accept or refuse antipsychotic drug treatment. 143 Chief Judge Coffin,
writing for the court, found this right rooted in the penumbral rights
of privacy, bodily integrity, and personal security guaranteed by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 144 The court held,
however, that a patient may be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic
drugs in an "emergency situation." 145 In identifying such a situation,
the court went beyond the district court's formulation, 146 and incorporated additional factors that must be considered by the hospital
medical staff member who is considering treating a patient with antipsychotic drugs.' 47 In accordance with these additional factors, the
medical staff member must make an "individualized" analysis of the
patient, including an estimation of the possibility and type of violence
that might occur without antipsychotic drug treatment, the likely effects
140. Id. at 1365-67. The court first noted that a patient's right of privacy, interpreted as protecting, among other things, an individual's bodily
integrity, allows him to refuse the antipsychotic medication as well as its concomitant dangerous side effects. Id. at 1365-66. Secondly, Judge Tauro held
that the involuntary administration of drugs violates a patient's first amendment right to freedom of thought. Id. at 1366-67. Judge Tauro reasoned
that such a right was necessarily implicated in an individual's first amendment
right to freedom of communication of ideas. Id. The court stated that "It]he
First Amendment protects the communication of ideas. That protected right of
communication presupposes a capacity to produce ideas. As a practical matter,
therefore, the power to produce ideas is fundamental to our cherished right
to communicate and is entitled to comparable constitutional protection."
Id. at 1367. Judge Tauro observed that these first amendment rights were
infringed by the drug's mind-altering effects on the patient's mood, attitude,
and thought processes. Id. at 1366-67.
141. Id. at 1364-65. The court did not create a special procedural due
process mechanism for reviewing a patient's refusal, but rather left undisturbed the patient's absolute right in non-emergency situations to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment. Id. at 1368-71.
142. The case was argued before Chief judge Coffin, and Judges Campbell and Davis. Chief Judge Coffin wrote the opinion.
143. 634 F.2d at 653.
144. Id. The court found it "unnecessary" to reach the district court's
implication of first amendment rights. Id. at 654 n.2.
145. Id. at 655-56 & 659-60.
146. See note 141 supra.
147. 634 F.2d at 655-56 & 659-60.
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appraisal of
of particular drugs on the particular patient, and an
48
available.
action
of
courses
alternative, less restrictive
In summarily discussing the least restrictive alternative treatment
it adopted, the court observed that the prior side effects of antipsychotics on the patient should be an. important factor in determining
how extensive an exploration of less restrictive alternative treatments
must be made by a psychiatrist. 49 In addressing the constitutional
prerequisites to the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs in
non-emergency situations, the court held that "the sine qua non for
the state's use of its parens patriae power as justification for the forceful administration of mind-affecting drugs is a determination that the
individual to whom the drugs are to be administered lacks the capacity
to decide for himself whether he should take the drugs." 150 Chief
Judge Coffin affirmed, by implication, the district court holding that
in both emergency and non-emergency situations some determination
of incompetency must be made before the patient may be treated. 151
148. In making this determination, the court identified two competing
interests at stake: 1) the institutional interest in a) protecting the public and
the medical staff by preventing violence in a setting containing a large concentration of individuals with a demonstrated proclivity for committing acts
of violence and b) preventing harm to the patients themselves from such
violence; and 2) the patient's interest in remaining free from the forcible
administration of antipsychotic drugs that may occasion temporary distress
and possible harmful after effects. Id. at 655. The court also noted that,
in order to satisfy the minimum procedural due process guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment, a determination that the medication is necessary
must be made by a qualified physician as to each individual patient who is
to be medicated. Id. at 656-57. Chief Justice Coffin left the district court
free on remand to determine what additional procedures might be warranted
to effectuate these guarantees. Id. at 656.
149. Id. The court posited the following:

[I]f the violence feared [of a patient] is potentially life-threatening,
and the patient's prior experience with antipsychotics favorable, it
would be patently unreasonable to require that defendants determine
that the probability of the feared violence occurring is greater than
fifty percent before they can act. By contrast, if the patient has
experienced severe adverse side-effects from antipsychotics, it would
be only reasonable to expect defendants to explore less harmful
alternatives much more vigorously than in the former case.
Id.

150. Id. at 657.

The court noted that to rule otherwise would be to

ignore the very justification for the state's purported exercise of its parens
patriae power-a citizen's inability to care for himself. id. Noting that the
Massachusetts judicial commitment statute contained no inference of a determination of incompetency of those committed, the court rejected the
defendants' argument that the Massachusetts judicial commitment proceedings
themselves result in a determination of mental illness and incapacity, which
overrides a patient's decision to reject voluntary hospitalization and its treatment. Id. at 657-59.
151. Id. at 659. The court did not specify what kind of determination
of incompetency was necessary. Id. Chief Judge Coffin stated:
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However, contrary to the district court, 5 2 he held that an emergency

situation may also be one in which any delay in treating the patient
could result in a significant deterioration of the patient's mental health,
and that, in such situations, means other than adjudicatory proceedings
must be employed. 53 Finally, the court rejected the district court's
requirement that, once a determination of incompetency is made, an
individual guardian must make all treatment decisions involving the
use of antipsychotic drugs, 54 and instead held that following a determination of incompetency, state actions based on parens patriae
interests must be taken with the aim of making treatment decisions
as the individual himself would were he competent to do so. 5
On writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the
case was vacated and remanded without reaching the constitutional
issues. 156 Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, held that
such a disposition of the case was appropriate because of the combination of two factors: 1) the unclear record in the case with respect
The point of our analysis is instead to demonstrate that the commit-

ment decision itself is an inadequate predicate to the forcible administration of drugs to an individual where the purported justification
for that action is the state's parens patriae power.
In so ruling, we recognize that there is a need for some procedure
whereby the state can provide needed treatment to an objecting
individual who lacks the capacity to make meaningful treatment decisions on his own.
Id.
152. See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
153. Id. at 659-60. The court accordingly vacated the district court's
definition of the emergency circumstances in which adjudications are not required and remanded the case "for consideration of alternative means for
making incompetency determinations in situations where any delay could
result in significant deterioration of the patient's mental health." Id. at 660.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 661. In so holding, the court cited as its main concern the
prevention of situations in which the best interests of a patient would dictate
the use of medication, but delay in receiving the necessary approval of the
guardian would delay such use, or deter such use by doctors. Id. at 661-62
n.9.
See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980). In Davis,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that
the fourteenth amendment's substantive due process guarantee of liberty
affords a competent mental patient the constitutional right to refuse psychotropic drugs. Id. at 929-33. The court found, however, that the state may
forcibly administer these drugs when it has "as a constitutional minimum"
at least probable cause to believe that the patient is presently violent or selfdestructive, and in such a condition is a present danger to himself, other
patients, or the medical staff. Id. at 935. The court noted that it is not
enough that the patient has at previous times exhibited violent tendencies.
Id. The court also determined that the state may impose psychotropic drugs
on the patient through its parens patriae power, but only upon a determination that the patient is not capable of rationally deciding for himself. Id.
at 935.
156. 102 S. Ct. at 2442.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 28: p. 101

to whether the plaintiffs rested their claimed substantive and procedural
liberty protections on state or federal law,157 and 2) the recent decision
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in In re Guardianship
of Roe,158 which, according to the Court, could influence the disposition of the case because of its express reliance on Massachusetts state
law as the basis of the individual's right to refuse treatment with
antipsychotic drugs."-9
The Court initially noted that the issue of whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a constitutional right to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs involves both substantive and procedural aspects. 1 0 The substantive aspect was identified by the Court
as involving the definition of the protected constitutional right, if
any, and a determination of the competing state interests which might
16
outweigh it.
The Court identified the procedural aspect as "the
minimum procedures required by the Constitution for determining
that the individual's liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular instance." 162 The Court then noted that the substantive and
procedural issues were intertwined with unavoidable questions of state
law, which might afford state citizens broader substantive and procedural rights than those afforded by the Constitution. 163 As a result,
the Court concluded, "the minimal requirements of the Federal Constitution would not be controlling, and would not need to be identified
in order to determine the legal rights and duties of persons within
that State." 104
The Court observed that after certiorari was granted in Rogers,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts announced its decision
in Roe. 16 5 Based on the holding in Roe,166 the Court concluded that
157. Id.

158. Id. at 2449 (citing In re Guardianship of Roe, - Mass.
N.E.2d 40 (1981)).
ing text infra.

-

,

421

For a discussion of Roe, see notes 208-16 and accompany-

159. 102 S. Ct. at 2450-51.
160. Id. at 2448.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2448-49. The Court noted the basic constitutional principle
that "[w]ithin our federal system the substantive (and procedural] rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a minimum. State law may
recognize liberty interests [and procedural protections thereof] more extensive
than those independently protected by the Federal Constitution." Id. at
2449.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing In re Guardianship of Roe, - Mass. - , 421 N.E.2d 40
(1981)).
166. The Roe court held that a noninstitutionalized mentally incompetent person has a protected liberty interest in deciding whether to accept

treatment with antipsychotic drugs. For a discussion of Roe, see notes 208-16
and accompanying text infra.
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Massachusetts common law might provide incompetents with substantive and procedural liberty rights broader than those of the Federal
Constitution. 167 The Court found, therefore, that it would be "inappropriate . . . to attempt to weigh or even to identify relevant liberty
interests that might be derived directly from the Constitution, independently of state law." 168 Accordingly, the Court held that, the
First Circuit on remand was to determine whether its holding should
be revised in light of Roe, whether Roe may require the certifica7
tion of "potentially dispositive state law questions to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts," or whether abstention might be
appropriate. 169 Thus, the continued vitality of the least restrictive
alternative treatment doctrine adopted by the First Circuit in Rogers
is uncertain.
IV. THE LEAST REsTRIcTivE ALTERNATIVE DOCTRINE:
AN ANALYSIS

The least restrictive alternative doctrine provides that governmental action must not intrude upon constitutionally protected interests to a degree greater than necessary to achieve a legitimate governmental purpose. 170 In the context of the rights of involuntarily
committed mental patients to refuse antipsychotic drugs, the application
of this doctrine means that the existence of a less restrictive alternative
treatment 17 must be considered in determining whether a mental
167. 102 S. Ct. at 2450. The Court came to this conclusion despite its
recognition that Roe was limited to noninstitutionalized mental patients. Id.
The Court also noted that "even if state procedural law itself remains unchanged by Roe, the federally mandated procedures will depend on the
nature and weight of the state interests, as well as the individual interests,
that are asserted. To identify the nature and scope of state interests that
are to be balanced against an individual's liberty interests, this Court may
look to state law." Id. at 2451.
168. Id. at 2451. The Court stated:
In applying this policy of restraint, we are uncertain here which
if any constitutional issues now must be decided to resolve the controversy between the parties. In the wake of Roe, III, we cannot say
with confidence that adjudication based solely on identification of
federal constitutional interests would determine the actual rights and
duties of the parties before us. And, as an additional cause for hesitation, our reading of the opinion of the Court of Appeals [in
Rogers v. Okin] has left us in doubt as to the extent to which state
issues were argued below and the degree to which the court's holdings may rest on subsequently altered state law foundations.
Id. at 2452.
169. Id. at 2452.
170. See note 95 and accompanying text supra & notes 183-231 and ac-

companying text infra.
171. For a discussion of the least restrictive alternative treatment standards
applied in Rennie and Mills at the circuit court levels, see notes 93-99 & 148-49
and accompanying text supra. Some possible alternative treatments that may
be less restrictive or detrimental in various circumstances include a different
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patient's right to refuse such drugs overrides the state's powers and
interests. 172
Members of the federal judiciary disagree as to whether the least
restrictive alternative treatment doctrine is appropriate as a constitutional factor in defining the scope of the right to refuse treatment. The
view advanced by the circuit court majority opinions in both Rogers v.
Okin 178 and Rennie v. Klein 174 is that the least restrictive alternative
treatment doctrine is such a constitutional factor. The First Circuit in
Rogers concluded that both the state police power and the availability
of a less restrictive alternative treatment are factors to be given equal
weight in the individualized evaluation of the appropriate treatment
to be administered to each patient in all circumstances. 17 Similarly,
the court in Rennie v. Klein was motivated by the importance of
balancing the state's police power and parens patriae interests with the
due process liberty interests retained by involuntarily committed mental
patients."76
The contrary view, expressed by Judge Garth in his separate
opinion in Rennie v. Klein,177 is that the least restrictive alternative
treatment standard should not be considered in the constitutional
determination of whether the state may forcibly administer antidrug, a smaller dosage of the intended drug, a different therapy, or physical
restraints (seclusion, straightjacket, cuffs, padded leather belt, and wristlets).
653 F.2d at 847; Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 940 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
For a discussion of the various therapies available to psychiatrists for the
treatment of mental patients, see Note, supra note 58, at 619-39. These
therapies include the non-intrusive counseling or behavior modes (milieu
therapy, psychotherapy and behavior modification) and the intrusive modes
which may or may not be coupled with counseling techniques (drug therapy
electroconvulsive therapy, electronic stimulation of the brain, lobotomy, and
stereotactic psychosurgery). Id. See also notes 57-58 and accompanying text
supra.

172. The enforcement of the state's interests in the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill is rooted in the state's police and parens patriae
powers. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 856 (Garth, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The state's police power is the power to protect the health and safety of the community, and the parens patriae power
is the power to act on behalf of an individual who does not have the mental
capacity to act in his own best interest. Id.
173. 634 F.2d at 650. For a discussion of Rogers v. Okin, see notes 132-

55 and accompanying text supra.
174. 653 F.2d at 836. For a discussion of Rennie, see notes 62-131 and
accompanying text supra.

175. 634 F.2d at 655-56.

See notes 148-49 and accompanying text supra.

The court in Rogers v. Okin required a case-by-case evaluation of the possibility and type of violence, the likely effects of a particular drug on the
individual, and an appraisal of less restrictive alternative treatments. Id. at 656.
176. 658 F.2d at 845-48. For a discussion of the least restrictive alternative treatment standard in Rennie, see notes 93-99 and accompanying text
supra.
177. For a discussion of Judge Garth's opinion, see notes 121-31 and
accompanying text supra.
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psychotic drugs over a patient's refusal, primarily because it would
be an unwarranted and unworkable intrusion of the judiciary into
an area which should be left to medical judgment and expertise.17 8
According to Judge Garth, the state may administer antipsychotic drugs
unconditionally if it demonstrates that an emergency situation exists,1 79
or that the patient does not have the mental capacity to make a ra.
tional decision with respect to medication.lS 0
It is submitted that from both a legal and operational standpoint,
the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine is an appropriate
constitutional factor to be employed by courts confronted with the
right to refuse treatment. The doctrine has gained wide recognition
by the courts in a variety of factual contexts and is essential to the
adequate protection of individual rights.' 8' The following analysis
will outline the various factual contexts in which the least restrictive
alternative doctrine has been accepted and applied as a legally per.
missible constitutional factor, including cases in which the doctrine
has been applied to the rights of involuntarily committed patients.
It will then examine the impact of applying the doctrine upon the
various interests implicated by a mental patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment. 8 2
A. Application of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine in
Defining Constitutional Rights
The least restrictive alternative doctrine has been applied regularly in various factual contexts by the United States Supreme Court.
In each instance, its application has been motivated by a recognition
of a duty to afford individuals the full protection of their constitutional
rights, even where the state has convinced the Court that some infringement on those rights is justified.
In Shelton v. Tucker, 8 the Court held that the least restrictive
alternative doctrine must be applied in protecting an individual's first
amendment rights.184 The Court struck down an Arkansas personal
history statute, 85 which required disclosure of organizational member178. 653 F.2d at 859, 861 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See notes 121-31 and accompanying text supra.
179. 653 F.2d at 857, 858 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). According to Judge Garth, an emergency situation would exist
where it is necessary to prevent the patient from endangering himself or
others. Id.
180. See notes 122-23 supra.
181. See notes 183-231 and accompanying text infra.
182. See notes 183-284 and accompanying text infra.
183. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
184. Id. at 488.
185. Id. at 480-83. The statute compelled every teacher, as a condition
of employment in state-supported schools or colleges, to file annually an
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ship, as overbroad and used the least restrictive alternative doctrine as a
"constitutional principle." 180 It stated that
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot' be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
The breadth of legislative
be more narrowly achieved.
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means
for achieving the same basic purpose. 8 7
Similarly, in Griswold v. Connecticut,88 the least restrictive alternative doctrine was used by the Court, under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, to protect an individual's right to privacy
which is embodied, as stated by the Court, in "several fundamental
constitutional guarantees." 189 In Griswold, suit was brought challenging the constitutionality of a Connecticut anti-contraception
statute.190 In finding the law unconstitutional,' 9 ' the Court relied
Upon the "fundamental principle" that "a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved -by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 192
affidavit listing every organization to which he or she had belonged or regularly attended within the preceding five years. Id.
186. Id. at 489. The Court made this characterization after a lengthy
review of first amendment cases it had decided since the early 1900's in which
the least restrictive alternative doctrine was consistently highlighted and applied. Id. at 488-89 (citing Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)).
187. 364 U.S. at 488 (footnotes omitted).
188. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
189. Id. at 485. The Court found the right of privacy rooted in various
constitutional provisions including the first amendment's rights of freedom
of the press, speech, and assembly, the third amendment's prohibition of the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent
of the owner, the fourth amendment's right against unreasonable search and
seizures, the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination, and the
ninth amendment's preservation of all constitutional rights without prejudice.
Id. at 482-85.
190, The statute made it a crime for any person to use "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception." Id. at
480 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958)).
191. 381 U.S. at 485.
192. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). The
Court has applied the doctrine under the due process clause in various other
instances. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (rights of
students to be free from corporal punishment without due process); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (rights of prisoners to disciplinary
proceedings must be accompanied by due process protections); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (right to travel with due process implications).
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The Court has also applied the least restrictive alternative doctrine in cases under the commerce clause of the Constitution. For
3
suit was
example, in Dean Milk Company v. City of Madison,19
brought by a milk distributor challenging the constitutionality of a
city ordinance which made it unlawful to sell any milk as pasteurized
unless it had been processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization plant within a five-mile radius of the city's central square. 194 In
striking down the ordinance as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, 195 the Court recognized limits to justifiable state regulation, stating that "even in the exercise of . . . [a state's] unquestioned
power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local
interests, are available," they must be used. 90
193. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
194. Id. at 350 (citing General Ordinance of the City of Madison § 7.21
(1949)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 354. The Court has also applied the least restrictive alternative doctrine under an equal protection analysis of state regulations. See,
e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). In Blumstein, the Court
held that the right to vote merited the application of the least restrictive means
doctrine. The Court stated:
The State cannot choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with "precision" . . . and must be
"tailored" to serve their legitimate objectives. And if there are
other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way
of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less drastic
means."
Id.
For a more complete discussion of the doctrine as it applies to the various
constitutional provisions discussed, see Struve, The Less Restrictive Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1463 (1967);
Wormuth & Merkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L.
REV. 254 (1964); Note, The Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment,
78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
Various federal appellate and district courts have also recognized and
applied the least restrictive alternative doctrine in various factual contexts
as has the Supreme Court. There is general agreement among at least four
federal circuits that under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment the states may constitutionally deprive pre-trial detainees of liberty
only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial. See, e.g.,
Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Malcom, 507
F.2d 333, 336-39 (2d Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835, 837-38 (5th
Cir. 1972) (en banc), modifying, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 848 (1972). But see Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 370-71 (1st.
Cir. 1978) (rejection of least restrictive alternative standard in equal protection strict scrutiny analysis of detainee's rights concerning prison conditions).
The federal district court for the Northern District of California has held
that under the eighth amendment of the Constitution accused criminals must
be confined at the most limited level of restrictiveness necessary to-ensure
their appearance at trial and prevent danger to prison security. Brenneman
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Although the above-mentioned cases recognize and accept the least
restrictive alternative doctrine in factual contexts that differ from that
of the involuntarily committed mental patient's right to refuse treatment, they support an application of the doctrine in that context.
The doctrine as applied in the above cases protects the same fundamental personal rights which serve as the basis of the involuntarily
committed mental patient's right to refuse treatment.19 7 These rights
include the first amendment right of freedom of speech 198 and the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of liberty.199 It is the importance
and sanctity of these constitutional rights which link all of these cases.
B. The Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine as Applied in the
Area of Mental Health Litigation
Within the last two decades, mental health litigation has also
evidenced a concern for the personal liberties of mentally ill and mentally retarded patients with the application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in varying factual contexts involving these patients.
In Romeo v. Youngberg,200 the doctrine was implemented by the
Third Circuit in the context of the rights of institutionalized mentally
retarded patients to receive adequate treatment.2 01 In Romeo, the
v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J.
941 (1970).
197. See notes 88-91 & 143-44 and accompanying text supra.
198. These constitutional rights have been protected under the least restrictive alternative doctrine. See notes 183-87 and accompanying text supra.
These rights have also been held to serve as the constitutional basis of the
involuntarily committed mental patient's right to refuse treatment. See notes
66 & 140 and accompanying text supra & note 258 infra.
199. The constitutional right to liberty has also been protected under
the least restrictive alternative doctrine. See notes 196 & 203 and accompanying
text supra. Such a right has also been firmly established as a constitutional
basis for the mental patient's right to refuse. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra.
200. 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2452
(1982).
201. On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the Third Circuit decision. 102 S. Ct. at 2463. However, it
must be noted that the Court did not expressly address the least restrictive
alternative doctrine in its disposition of the case. Id. at 2457 n.14. As a result,
it is suggested that the Third Circuit's acceptance of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in Romeo cannot be characterized as vacated. Accordingly,
this comment will discuss the least restrictive alternative doctrine as accepted
and applied by the Third Circuit as a viable legal doctrine in the context of
the rights of institutionalized mentally retarded patients.
It must be noted that Romeo did not mark the debut of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in the area of the mentally handicapped. As
the Third Circuit noted in Romeo, the doctrine has been applied in this
area, but in reference to the patient's environment, not to ongoing therapeutic regimens or medical prescriptions. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373
F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
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plaintiff brought an action 202 against officials of the Pennhurst State.
School and Hospital in Pennsylvania, alleging that the defendants
improperly shackled him, failed to provide adequate protection for him
from other residents, and afforded him inadequate treatment.203 In
vacating the district court's verdict for the defendants and remanding
the case for a new trial, 204 the Third Circuit discussed the least restrictive alternative doctrine and indicated that "[w]here the issue
turns on which of two or more major treatment approaches is to be
Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific order, 414 U.S. 473,
order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F.
Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) and 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
203. 644 F.2d at 154-56. The plaintiff was a 30-year-old mentally retarded person, suffering from a chemical imbalance of the brain that rendered
his mental capacity approximately that of an 18-month-old child. Id. at 15455. The plaintiff received various injuries resulting from attacks by other
patients. These included a broken arm, fractured finger, and injuries to the
sexual organs. Id. at 155. Also, after initiation of the suit, the defendants
kept the plaintiff shackled to a bed or chair in the hospital for long periods
each day and allegedly gave him inadequate medical attention. Id.
204. Id. at 172. The Third Circuit rejected the district court's application of an eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment standard as inappropriate in the context of civil (as distinguished from criminal) confinement, and turned instead to a fourteenth amendment analysis to determine
if the plaintiff's liberty interests were adequately protected. Id. at 156.
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated
and remanded the Third Circuit's decision, holding that the plaintiff had
constitutionally protected liberty interests under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment which entitled him to reasonably safe conditions
of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate training as reasonably may be required by these interests.
102 S.Ct. at 2458-60. The Court also held that the plaintiff's constitutional
rights must be balanced against the relevant interests of the state in protecting
the patients and others in the institutions. Id. at 2460-61. The proper
standard for determining whether the State has adequately protected such
rights, the Court held, is whether professional judgment was in fact exercised
by medical personnel at the institutions. Id. at 2461. The Court also held
that in determining what is "reasonable," courts must show deference to the
judgment exercised by a qualified professional, whose decision is presumptively
valid. Id. at 2461-62. According to the Court, liability may be imposed on
the professional "only when the decision . . .is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment." Id. at 2462.
It is arguable that this language by the Court, granting extreme deference
to the professional judgment of the medical personnel at the institutions,
means that, if the professional applies a treatment within the range of "accepted professional judgment," it does not have to be the least restrictive
treatment available. The Supreme Court, however, expressly stated that applicability of the least restrictive alternative was not present in the case. Id.
at 2457 n.14.
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adopted, a 'least intrusive' analysis may be appropriate." 205 The
court recognized, however, that under the least restrictive alternative
doctrine, the possibility of the effectiveness of a course of treatment
and the danger of side effects must be considered. Where both exist,
the court stated, the State should err in favor of the patient's safety. a- °
This observation by the court shows its concern that a patient's constitutional interests be infringed only in the least restrictive manner
207
available, even where the treatment would be potentially effective.
2
08
In the most recent case of In re Guardianship of Roe,
the
parents of Richard Roe, III, a temporarily committed mentally ill
patient, successfully petitioned the Massachusetts Probate Court to appoint the father as temporary and then permanent guardian of their
son. 20 9

As guardian,

the father was by implication

authorized to

make treatment decisions for his son.210 Upon motion of Roe's
guardian ad litem, however, the court prohibited the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to Roe.2 11 On appeal to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the issue was whether the
guardian of a mentally ill person has the authority to consent to the
forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to his non-institutionalized
ward in the absence of an emergency. 212 The court held that such
205. 644 F.2d at 166.
206. Id. at 166 & n.45.
207. The court did note that any judicial scrutiny under the least restrictive alternative doctrine must be made of treatment programs, and not
day-to-day or hour-to-hour medical decisions. Id. at 166-67, 168-69. In the
appendix to the opinion, the court certified the following proposed jury
instruction:
If you find that a selection of a mode of treatment subjected the
plaintiff to significant deprivations of liberty, then you must go on
and determine whether that decision provided for the least intrusive
treatment available under the circumstances. If the defendants considered other alternatives and ascertained that the program adopted
was the least intrusive available, then you should find the defendants not liable.
Id. at 173 (Appendix III C).
208. -

Mass.

-,

421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).

209. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 44. Richard Roe, III, was temporarily
committed to a state mental hospital for observation as a result of being
charged with attempted unarmed robbery and assault and battery. Id. It
was recommended that he be treated with antipsychotics, but Roe refused.
Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. The initial prohibition was for a 10-day period. Id. A single
justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, extended the
stay until the time at which the court could hear the case on its merits. Id.
212. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 42. The court also addressed the issues
of whether the appointment of the guardians was proper in the circumstances
presented in the case, and what the proper standard of proof in guardianship
proceedings should be. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 45. It must be noted that
even though the ward in this case, Richard Roe, III, was institutionalized
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a guardian has no authority to consent to the administration of antipsychotics in these circumstances.2 13 The court determined instead
that a judicial determination was required to arrive at a "substituted
judgment." 214 The court also held that in making such "substituted
judgments," the courts must respect the least restrictive alternative
treatment doctrine where the state's interests in protecting the public
safety justify forcible treatment of an individual. 15 The court noted
that "[t]he right to the least instrusive means is derived from the right
to privacy, which stands as a constitutional expression of the 'sanctity
of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental con-

stituents of life.'

"

216

In Lake v. Cameron,217 the plaintiff, Catherine Lake, a sixty-yearold woman, was in commitment proceedings determined to be unable
to care for herself and was consequently institutionalized in a mental
for observation at various times, the case was decided in the factual context
of a non-institutionalized mentally ill person. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 62.
213. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 50.
214. Id. The court elaborated:
No medical expertise is required in such a . . . (determination],
although medical advice and opinion is to be used for the same purposes and sought to the same extent that the incompetent individual
would, if he were competent. We emphasize that the determination
is not medically what is in the ward's best interest-a determination
better left to those with extensive medical training and experience.
The determination of what the incompetent individual would do if
competent will probe . . . [his] values and preferences, and such an
inquiry, in a case involving antipsychotic drugs, is best made in courts
of competent jurisdiction.
Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 52. The court noted that the judicial determination
of substituted judgment is a subjective rather than an objective determination. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 56. Among the factors to be considered by
the court in such a determination are 1) the ward's expressed preferences
regarding treatment, 2) his religious beliefs, and 3) the probability of adverse side effects. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 57-59.
The court also noted that circumstances exist in which the individual's
right to refuse is subordinate to state interests. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 59.
The court identified these state interests as, inter alia, 1) the preservation of
life, 2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties, 3) the prevention of suicide, and 4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession. Id. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977)).
215. - Mass. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 61. The court determined that the
choices available to the non-institutionalized patient were involuntary commitment or involuntary medication. Id. According to the court, in applying
the least restrictive alternative doctrine, courts are to choose those "means of
restraint which would be chosen by the ward if he were competent to choose."
Id. at n.24.
216. Id. at 61 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977)). Interestingly, the
Roe court, in an earlier portion of its opinion, cited the First Circuit's opinion
in Rogers for this proposition. Id. at 50 n.9.
217. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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hospital. 218 The plaintiff appealed the denial of her petition for a
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that more appropriate treatment
was available to her in a setting less restrictive than the "total confinement" of the hospital.21 9 Writing for the court, Chief Judge BazeIon held that "[d]eprivations of liberty solely because of dangers to
the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary
for their protection." 220 Instructions were given to the district court
on remand to consider alternative courses of treatment, such as requiring Mrs. Lake to carry an identification card to ensure her speedy
return home if she should wander, or requiring treatment in a public
221
nursing home or community mental health center.
In Covington v. Harris,222 decided three years after Lake 223 by
the same court, the plaintiff was civilly committed to the maximum security pavilion of a mental hospital. 224 Covington's habeas corpus petition seeking transfer from the maximum security pavilion to a less
218. Id. at 658. The plaintiff was found to be suffering from "a 'chronic
brain syndrome' associated with aging." Id. The case originated with a
habeas corpus petition seeking release from a mental hospital where the
petitioner had been sent after being detained for wandering the streets of
Washington, D.C. Id. During the pendency of the commitment proceeding,
Mrs. Lake was adjudged "of unsound mind" and committed to the same
mental hospital. Id.
219. Id. at 659. Mrs. Lake did not contest the legality of the decision
itself to commit and impose treatment. Id.
220. Id. at 660 (footnote omitted). Chief judge Bazelon reasoned that
"though [the plaintiff] cannot be given such care . . . [as a wealthy person
because of her indigency] an earnest effort should be made to review and
exhaust available resources of the community in order to provide care reasonably suited to her needs." Id. (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 661. After Lake, several jurisdictions applied the least restrictive alternative standard in civil commitment decisions. See, e.g., In re
Walls 442 F.2d 749, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp.
439, 452-53 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Dixon v. Attorney Gen. of Pa., 325 F. Supp.
966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971). Following the decision in Lake, the application of
the doctrine was also suggested for the civil commitment of individuals under
sexual psychopath statutes. See Fuller v. United States, 390 F.2d 468, 471
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, J., concurring). In a recent case, the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut held that a criminal defendant
who is found incompetent to stand trial should be involuntarily committed
only after a consideration of the least restrictive alternatives consistent with
his restoration to capacity. DeAngelas v. Plaut, 503 F. Supp. 775, 780-81 (D.C.
Conn. 1980). However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently rejected the
doctrine's application to commitment hearings under that state's juvenile code.
See J.K. v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 426, 228 N.W.2d 713 (1975).
222. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
223. For a discussion of Lake, see notes 217-21 and accompanying text
supra.
224. 419 F.2d at 619. Covington was initially found incompetent to
stand trial on a murder charge based on a finding that he had "'mental deficiency [38 I.Q.] with psychotic reaction'." Id. The murder charge was dismissed. Id.
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restrictive ward was dismissed by the district court.22
On appeal,
Chief Judge Bazelon ruled that the least restrictive alternative doctrine
fashioned in Lake 22 6 was also applicable to treatment decisions during
2 27
involuntary hospitalization.
Since Covington, other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine of
least restrictive treatment to post-commitment treatment decisions involving a hospitalized patient's transfer to a more restrictive ward, 22 8
and, generally, the right of all patients to receive treatment. 229 Moreover, several jurisdictions have suggested that the doctrine applies to
conditional discharge 230 and outright release decisions. 231
The above cases in the mental health area indicate that the least
restrictive alternative doctrine is a vital and active legal doctrine capable
of application to prevent unjustifiable intrusions into a mental patient's constitutional rights.
C. Application of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine in
Defining the Scope of the Right to Refuse Treatment:
An OperationalAnalysis
In ultimately deciding whether the least restrictive alternative
doctrine is a legitimate factor to be used in the context of an involuntarily committed mental patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs,
an operational analysis of the effects of this application will next be
undertaken. 2 2 It is submitted that a balancing of the quantity and
quality of benefits and detriments to each party affected by this application-psychiatrist, judiciary, patient, and state-is necessary to determine the constitutional validity of requiring the application of the
225. Id. at 619-20.
226. For a discussion of the Lake holding, see text accompanying note 220
supra.
227. 419 F.2d at 623-24. Judge Bazelon stated:
It makes little sense to guard zealously against the possibility of unwarranted deprivations prior to hospitalization, only to abandon the
watch once the patient disappears behind hospital doors. The range
of possible dispositions of a mentally ill person within a hospital,
from maximum security to outpatient status, is almost as wide as
that of dispositions without.
Id.
228. See, e.g., Ploof v. Brooks, 342 F. Supp. 999 (D. Vt. 1972); In re
D.D., 118 N.J. Super. 1, 285 A.2d 283 (1971); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous,
33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1973).
229. See, e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977); State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 395, 316 A.2d 449,
464 (1974) (Clifford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. In re Lublin, 85 Misc.2d 48, 378 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Suffolk Co. Ct.,
1976).
232. See notes 233-84 and accompanying text infra.
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least restrictive alternative doctrine in the area of mental patients'
refusals of antipsychotic drugs.
1. Interests of Psychiatrists and Medical Staff
Application of the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine
directly bears on the interests of the psychiatrist233 because judicial
review of the medical treatment decisions made for various patients
will necessarily accompany the doctrine.234 The psychiatrist will be
required to participate in judicial hearings to explain various aspects
of a patient's treatment program by producing medical records and
medical treatment data on various patients, 23 by appearing personally
to testify, or both. The practical results would, therefore, seemingly
include an additional burden on the psychiatrist's time, and a possible
interference with his administrative duties, medical judgment, and
treatment philosophies. 236 From the psychiatrist's point of view, these
practical consequences might seem to be an alarming intrusion into
his practice. 237 It is suggested, however, that there are four factors
which not only allow but compel this intrusion. First, under the
least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine as adopted by the circuit
courts of appeals in Rennie238 and Rogers,239 interference with a
233.
compass
234.
hearing,

Use of the word "psychiatrist" in this comment is intended to enthe entire medical staff of mental hospitals.
This judicial review would possibly consist of a formal or informal
in which the facts surrounding the particular patient's treatment

program would be determined through the presentation of evidence and

testimony (the extent of which may be flexible), in which medical testimony
as to the least restrictive treatment available would be offered by qualified
psychiatric personnel, and in which a decision would be rendered by the
judge as to whether the treatment program at issue is, in fact, the least restrictive. The judge, with the assistance of qualified psychiatric testimony,
would retain the power to reform an unacceptable, non-restrictive treatment
program, and enforce sanctions against the treating psychiatrist for failure
to administer the reformed program.
235. Situations may be posited in which a hospital may not have a collection of medical treatment data or medical records of patients as extensive as a court may require in order to effectively monitor a patient's treatment program. In these cases, application of the doctrine would allow the
judge to dictate what information must be compiled over the course of the
treatment program.
236. This burden and interference could result from a least restrictive
alternative treatment order by the judiciary or subsequent remedial penalties
for failure to tailor the treatment program as judicially ordered.
237. This potential intrusion was cited by Judge Garth in Rennie v.
Klein as a primary reason for his rejection of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine in the context of the mental patient's right to refuse treatment.
See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
238. For a discussion of Rennie v. Klein, see notes 62-131 and accompanying text supra.
239. For a discussion of the First Circuit's opinion in Mills v. Rogers,
see notes 142-55 and accompanying text supra.
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psychiatrist's time and administrative duties will actually be negligible
in relation to the daily time and effort he devotes to his practice because the court will only review treatment programs and not daily
decisions. 240 Secondly, recent studies have demonstrated that psychiatrists often do not approach the treatment of mental patients with
24
adequate concern for their rehabilitation and care. ' Thirdly, the intrusion may force the state and the psychiatric profession to re-examine
and develop a conscious awareness of the importance of the patient's
interests, thereby inducing further research and the creation of programs for the benefit of these patients. 242 Although the psychiatric
profession may feel resentful or burdened as a result of this judicial
oversight, it is consistent with the professional and ethical duties owed
by the psychiatric profession to its patients. 243 Finally, the interests
of the state and of the mental patient should weigh more heavily in
this balancing of interests analysis than do the interests of the
244
psychiatrists.
240. The circuit courts in Rennie and Mills held that the doctrine
applies to an entire treatment program rather than to the daily or hourly
administration of medical treatment. See notes 99 & 148 and accompanying
text supra. Therefore, judicial review under the doctrine and the burden
it would place on the psychiatrist's time would thus be triggered only on
an infrequent basis, after a treatment program has been formulated, applied,
and evaluated-a period which may encompass weeks or months. The actual
period over which the treatment program will progress until it is reviewed,
if ever, will depend on a number of factors, including whether the patient
does in fact assert his right to a least restrictive treatment; the amenability
of the particular psychiatrist to suggestions for changes in the treatment program by the patient or his counsel; and, if the program becomes subject
to judicial review, the particular judge's degree of adherence to the standards
set forth by the circuit courts in Rennie and Rogers with respect to review
of a treatment program rather than of the daily or hourly administration of
medication. For a discussion of the review of treatment programs as set
out in Rennie and Rogers, see notes 99 & 148 and accompanying text supra.
241. For a discussion of these studies, see note 5 and accompanying text
supra.

242. Enforcement of the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine
may serve to awaken the psychiatric profession as a whole to the specific,
and largely neglected, needs of the mentally ill patient, and to new methods
or medications for treating these needs and rehabilitating mental patients.
243. Perhaps mental patients and society can take solace in statements
made by Dr. Michael Alfred Piezke made in response to criticism directed
against the psychiatric profession:
The challenge of . . . criticism, however, is that it continually
forces the profession to look to itself for greater skill and precision in
its language and in the treatment modalities that it delivers. If there
is one thing that psychiatry, as part of medicine, can take pride in,
it is its humility and willingness to incorporate into its practices
lessons learned from experience.
M. A. Piezke, supra note 4, at 73-74.
244. For a discussion of the state's interest, see notes 253-64 and accompanying text infra. The patients' interests are dealt with at notes 257-72
and accompanying text infra.
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2. Interests of the Judiciary
Application of the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine
requires the judiciary to review medical treatment decisions and to
monitor the consequences. 245 These tasks necessarily result in an increased burden and stress on the judges' time and expertise. Judges
will be periodically faced with the duties of arranging, preparing for,
and conducting hearings. 246 Furthermore, the judge, in his limited
capacity as a decisionmaker without medical training, will nevertheless be called upon to ultimately determine the least restrictive alternative treatment in each situation. It is submitted, however, that this
reliance on the judge's limited expertise will be eased by documentary
evidence and testimony, including that of medical experts, produced
247
at the hearing.
Critics of the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine have
cited the effect on judicial time and the lack of expertise as the primary reasons for rejection of the doctrine in this context. 248 The
flaw in this criticism, with respect to the burden on judicial time, lies
in its focus on the immediate effects of the application of the doctrine.249 The focus might be more properly placed on the long-term
effects of the doctrine. It is suggested that in the long-run the application of the doctrine will reduce judicial involvement in treatment
decisions by increasing the state and medical professionals' concern
and accountability for the rehabilitation and care of patients through
treatment. 25 0 The result would thus be a lower incidence of patientcontested treatment decisions. It is further submitted that a blanket
adoption of the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine by the
judiciary would effectively destroy the possibility of irresponsible and
convenience-oriented treatment of mental patients by the mental establishment.2 51 It is submitted that due to the lack of constructive re245. For a discussion of the possible nature of these judicial review
proceedings, see note 234 supra.
246. Id.
247. For a discussion of the probable nature of the judicial hearings,
see note 234 supra. In fact, given the possibility that the treatment approach
at issue involves an evaluation of complicated mental illnesses and various
treatment methods, medications, and consequences, it is arguable that the
psychiatric expert at the hearing may be relied on by the court to such a
great degree that "judicial expertise" may not actually be exercised at all.
248. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 859, 861, and note 123 and accompanying text supra.

249. For a discussion of the immediate effects on the judiciary of the
doctrine's application, see text accompanying notes 245-47 supra.
250. A necessary premise to this conclusion is that the state and professional psychiatric authorities will implement responsible and constructive
treatment programs subsequent to a court's imposition of the least restrictive
alternative doctrine in this context. For a discussion of this premise, see
notes 242-43 and accompanying text supra.
251. For a discussion of this convenience-oriented treatment, see notes 5
& 241 and accompanying text supra.
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sponses to the plight of the mental patient by state and professional
medical authorities, 252 the burden on the courts associated with the
adoption and application of the least restrictive alternative treatment
253
doctrine is a necessary short-term evil.
Criticism of the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine as
an improper usurpation of medical decisions by an unqualified judiciary 254 may be rebutted in two ways. First, as discussed above, the
use of medical documentary evidence and expert testimony in the hearings will provide a sound resource on which the judiciary may rely
in the judgment process. 255 Secondly, and most important, it cannot
be forgotten that courts are frequently called upon to make specialized
and difficult decisions in many areas as part of their duty to decide
2 56
cases and controversies.
3. Interests of the Patient
Among the interests of a patient that are affected by the forced
use of the antipsychotic drugs is his interest in remaining free from
unwarranted intrusions into his physical person 257 and his mind. 25 8
252. Id.
253. The duration of this short-term burden necessarily depends upon
the
response
time of the state and professional psychiatric authorities to the
judicial
imposition
of least restrictive treatment orders, and/or penalties for
failure to follow those orders. It would be too speculative to estimate when
this will occur.
254. For a discussion of this criticism of the doctrine, see note 123 and
accompanying text supra.
255. For a discussion of these hearings, see note 234 and accompanying
text supra.
256. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Court called upon to
decide issue of whether, and to what degree, a woman's right to have an
abortion exists and the medical questions that necessarily surrounded such
an issue).
257. Accordingly, the court in Rennie found a constitutional basis for
this interest in the guarantee of liberty found in the fourteenth amendment.
See 653 F.2d at 841-44. See also notes 85-91 and accompanying text supra.
The circuit court in Mills v. Rogers found this interest rooted in the constitutional right to privacy. See 634 F.2d at 650. See also notes 143-44 and
accompanying text supra. Also, a number of cases have rooted this interest
in the eighth amendment. See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1138 (8th
Cir. 1973) (administration of vomit-inducing drug in treatment of mental
institution inmate without his written consent constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment); Mackey v. Procunier,
477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (allegation of administration of "fright drug"
to patient at state medical facility without his consent sufficiently asserted a
cause of action in cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment); Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 205
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (administration of antipsychotics to youths at juvenile detention center without supervision by a physician under an ongoing treatment program is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment).
258. Various courts have found the first amendment's right to mentation
or thought as the constitutional root of this interest. See Scott v. Plante,
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In the history of the common law, there is perhaps no right which is
more respected than a person's right to be free from unwarranted
personal contact. As early as the middle of the thirteenth century,
English law provided a method for monetary recovery for unauthorized
contacts with the person.2 59 In fact, at a very early time, the cause of
action required only a slight force, and did not depend upon whether
the touching was done intentionally, negligently, or even accidentally.260 It is this very interest in physical security of the person and
integrity of the body upon which the modern tort of battery is premised,2 61 and which is also protected by other tort actions including
assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 262 The interest
of the person in the physical security of his body was also recognized
in the 39th Article of the Magna Carta and was referred to by Blackstone as one of the three elements of liberty guaranteed to all Englishmen. 263 Furthermore, our own constitutional history is filled with
references to the importance of the "inviolability of the person." 204
532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th

Cir. 1973); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D. Mass. 1979), modified and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. at 2442 (1982).
259. See F. W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 40,
43, 53 (1971); Dreiser, The Development of Principle in Trespass, 27 YALE
L.J. 220 (1917); Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE
L.J. 799 (1924). See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 930 (N.D. Ohio
1980). This action was maintained through a writ of trespass vi et armis.
506 F. Supp. at 930.
260. See F. W. MAITLAND, supra note 259, at 43; 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 375 (3d ed. 1927). By the fourteenth century, an
action in trespass would lie for any attempted battery which had failed to
take place. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 915, 931 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(citing 8 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 422).
261. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13 & 18 (1934); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, 19 (1965); Cole v. Turner, 6 Mod. Rep. 149,
87 Eng. Rep. 807 (1704). See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 931
(N.D. Ohio 1980).
262. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 10 & 12 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser defines assault as follows:
The interest in freedom from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with the person, as distinguished from the contact itself,
is protected by an action for the tort known as assault. No actual
contact is necessary to it, and the plaintiff is protected against a
purely mental disturbance of his personal integrity.
Id. § 10, at 37-38 (emphasis added).
263. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term Liberty, 4 HARV. L. REV.
365, 373 (1891) (citing the 39th Article of the Magna Carta, 9 Henry III, and
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 424).

264. See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 931 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(quoting Union Pacific Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). In Botsford, Justice Gray stated that "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraints on interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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In fact, the prevailing constitutional tests which are. applied by the
courts to determine whether state action is constitutional differentiate
between the fundamental interests, which include the interest in personal security, 265 and the economic interests of the individual, with
the former afforded more protection. 26 And, as Professor Tribe states,
"[t]he Constitution was consecrated to the blessings of liberty for ourselves and posterity. . . . [T]hose aspects of self . . .must be preserved
and allowed to flourish if we are to promote the fullest development
of human faculties and ensure the greatest breadth to personal
liberty .... ,,267
The invasive use of antipsychotic drugs is likely to cause dysfunctions of the patient's mental nervous system as well as other symptoms. 268 The patient may experience dizziness, weakness, or fainting. 269
His appetite, heart rate, vision, and skin may be affected by the
drugs27 0 Muscle spasms and uncontrollable movements of the face,
neck, tongue, and arms may occur along with other bizarre muscular
activity.2 71
And unfortunately, some of these symptoms may be
272
permanent.
265. For a discussion of this interest in the context of the patient affected
by the use of antipsychotics, see notes 257-58 and accompanying text supra.
266. In order to pass constitutional muster, state action that infringes
upon the "personal" or "fundamental" rights of an individual is strictly
scrutinized. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (limitations
on the right of privacy bearing on the right to have an abortion must further
a compelling state interest). On the other hand, state action that regulates
the economic interests of the individual must only have some rational relation
to a legitimate governmental purpose. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (economic regulation upheld if it is rationally related
to a legitimate governmental end). The distinctions in the level of scrutiny
applied by the Court to the various interests of the individual is rooted in
the relative weight and importance afforded such interests.
267. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

893

(1978).

Professor

Tribe, addressing the issue of dangers to the rights of privacy and personhood presented by society, has stated further:
It is to resist such dangers that rights of personhood are elaborated, serving both as reminders of values to be preserved and as hints
of values not yet realized. . . . Any fundamental rights of personhood and privacy too precisely or inflexibly defined defy the seasons
and are likely to be bypassed by the spring floods. The best we can
hope for is to encourage wise reflection-through strict scrutiny of
any government action or deliberate omission that appears to transgress what it means to be human at a given time and place. Nothing
less will yield a language and structure for creating a future continuous with and contiguous to the most humane designs of the past.
Id. at 892-93.
268. For a full discussion of the side effects of antipsychotic drugs, see
text and accompany notes 44-56.
269. See text accompanying notes 44-45.
270. See text accompanying notes 46-51.
271. See text accompanying notes 43-55.
272. See text accompanying note 56.
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These effects represent the most extreme intrusion into the physical
person and into the physical and mental security of an individual,
since he is unable to combat or even control them in the slightest
way. The drugs take up an authoritative residence in the mental patient's body. In these circumstances, the patient retains as much liberty
to control his basic bodily functions as does a puppet-none. His constitutional right of liberty, as it relates to the most basic functions of
a person-the control of one's body movements-becomes substantially
impaired.
4. Interests of the State:
The interests of society would also be affected by an adoption of
the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine in a constitutional
analysis of the involuntarily committed mental patient's right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs. First, the state has an interest in protecting the
public from individuals who may be dangerous to both the public
and themselves.2 73 It is firmly established that the state is justified
under a proper exercise of its police power in restricting the liberty of
individuals in emergency situations. 274 This restriction is accomplished
initially by involuntary commitment of the individual to protect the
general public. 27 5 Subsequently, the individual may be subject to
further restriction within the mental hospital to protect others in the
hospital, including the patients, the medical staff, and visitors. 276 Second, the state has an interest in caring for members of society who are
unable to care for themselves, with the ultimate objective of making
them constructive members of society. This interest falls under the
state's parens patriae power. 277 Again, involuntary commitment of an
individual is the first step in accomplishing this restriction by placing
the individual in an environment where he can be treated. 278 Thereafter, various types of treatment may be given to the individual in
273. For a discussion of the state's interests triggered by the institutionalization of mentally ill individuals, see notes 90, 148 & 155 and accompanying text supra.
274. Id.
275. For a discussion of involuntary commitment procedures, see A.
BROOKS, supra note 48, at 605-06 (1974).
276. Such restriction may take the form of medication, including psychotropic drugs, mechanical restraints or physical restraints. See notes 57-58 &
172 and accompanying text supra.
277. For a discussion of the state's parens patriae power, see notes 90 &
152-55 and accompanying text supra; Siegel, The Justification for Medical
Commitment-Real or Illusory?, 6 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 21, 29-33 (1969).
See also an array of articles compiled by Professor Brooks on involuntary
civil commitment. A. BROOKS, supra note 48, at 601-05.
278. For a discussion of involuntary commitment procedures, see A.
BROOKS, supra note 66, at 675-78.
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147

an attempt to improve his condition and develop him into a functional
member of society.

279

Application of the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine
affects these state interests by restricting the state in its choice of treatments for the mental patient in certain situations. Under the doctrine, the state would be unable to pick and choose among various
treatments. 2 0 Rather, it would be required to adopt the treatment
28
that least infringes upon the patient's interests in bodily integrity.
It is submitted that application of the doctrine does not interfere
with the state's interests per se, but only restricts the means by which
the state may protect and advance these interests. 28 2 The purposes
underlying the state's interests-protection of the public and medical
staff from the patient, and the patient from himself-would not be
frustrated.
The final interest of the state that would be affected by application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine is the control of the
costs of mental health. The state has an interest in providing proper
medical care to the mentally ill at the least expense to the taxpaying
public. It is suggested that an application of the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine could actually work to reduce the expense
of medical care for the mentally ill by reducing the dependency of
mental hospitals on antipsychotic drugs.28 3 Further, savings may be
garnered because the
as physical restraints
reusable. Therefore,
initial fixed purchase

tools associated with alternative treatments, such
in the form of ties or straight-jackets, may be
the primary, non-recurring cost would be the
cost of such tools. 2 84 Given the present alleged

279. For a discussion of the various treatments available, see note 172
and accompanying text supra.
280. For a discussion of the definition of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine, see notes 170-72 and accompanying text supra.
281. Id.
282. After the doctrine is applied, the states are still able to protect their
interests, but can do so only in a more limited manner. For example, in a
particular emergency circumstance, the state may be just as able to protect
the attending psychiatrists and medical personnel, as well as the patient, by
using a straight-jacket or wristlets rather than psychotropic medication, and,
in particular, antipsychotics. For a discussion of the least restrictive alternative doctrine, see note 172 and accompanying text supra.
283. The initial fact to be noted is that the use of antipsychotic drugs
by psychiatrists in medical hospitals in the treatment of mentally ill patients
is a nationwide phenomenon. It is the rule rather than the exception. In
addition, these drugs obviously cannot be reused. Like any other medication,
they are expended when used and must be replaced if needed again. See
notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
284. Of course, there would be costs associated with such tools, including
maintenance and replacement. However, these costs can be reasonably expected to be proportionately low over their useful lives. Further, if psychoanalytical therapy is used as an alternative treatment, it can be seen that there
will be no additional costs associated with such treatment beyond the recur.
ring annual salary paid to the state psychiatrist.
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overuse of antipsychotic drugs in mental hospitals, it is submitted that
application of the doctrine will most certainly result in a reduction of
the use of antipsychotic drugs and the costs associated with them.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is submitted that an analysis of the relevant interests affected
by application of the least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine
and of the acceptance of the doctrine in other factual contexts supports a conclusion that the doctrine must be adopted in a constitutional analysis of the right of the involuntarily committed mental
patient to refuse antipsychotic drugs. The initial premise underlying
this conclusion is that the interests of the patient are the most important of those affected, as demonstrated by the doctrine's precedential acceptance in varying factual contexts, and, therefore, any medical
and judicial decisions affecting them must be more closely scrutinized.
The least restrictive alternative treatment doctrine protects the personal or fundamental interests of the patient by requiring medical personnel to apply that treatment which will result in the least intrusion
into such interests while affording the patient a rehabilitative effect.
The benefits of the doctrine are not, however, restricted to the
patient. It is submitted that adoption of the doctrine would also
result in long-term economic benefits to society by reducing the amounts
of money expended for medical care. It is further submitted that the
interests of the judiciary will be promoted by a gradual transfer of its
initial involvement in treatment decisions back to the psychiatric profession, where it primarily belongs, once the application of the doctrine gains widespread acceptance. Finally, it is suggested that adoption of the doctrine will improve the present levels of responsibility
and accountability of the psychiatric profession to the best interests of
the medical patient.
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